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Abstract 
The present research examines the implications of the “genocide” label in historical 
representations for national identity, collective memory and reparative action. Study 1 exposed 
European American participants to different representations of the colonial encounter which 
construed historical violence as either “societal change” or “genocide”. Results revealed that 
perception of harm and support for reparative action (indirectly via perception of harm) were 
greater among participants exposed to the “genocide” than “societal change” representation, even 
in a context (i.e. identity salience) that otherwise promotes denial of harm and opposition to 
reparative action. Moreover, participants in an identity salience condition or who scored high on 
national glorification tended to silence critical commemoration, despite the otherwise facilitating 
effect of the genocide representation. Study 2 exposed Costa Rican participants to different 
representations that construed the colonial encounter as either “societal change” or “genocide”. 
Results revealed that the “genocide” representation led to a decrease in the centrality of Costa 
Rican identity, which in turn reduced support for Indigenous rights policy. Study 3 exposed 
European American participants to representations of either own-group or other-group wrong-
doing which construed historical violence as either “calamity” or “genocide”. Participants 
exposed to the “genocide” representation perceived historical violence as more relevant to 
present day reality, and reported somewhat greater support for reparative action, but only when 
the label referred to other group’s wrongdoing. When “genocide” referred to own group’s 
wrongdoing, participants perceived historical violence as less atrocious and reported less support 
for reparative action. Discussion focuses on the implications of the “genocide” label for national 
identity, collective memory and reparative action. 
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What’s in a Name? 
Psychological Implications of the “Genocide” Label  
Within popular imagination and scholarly discourse, genocide represents “the gravest 
form of crime against humanity” (Ternon, 1999, p. 238), “the most barbaric crime” (Scherrer, 
1999, p. 14), and “the ultimate human rights violation” (Jonassohn & Bjornson, 1998, p. 98). 
While a depiction of genocide as the absolute crime appears self-evident, a consensual definition 
of genocide remains elusive. The multiplicity in conceptualizations and typologies of genocide 
(for reviews, see Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Churchill, 1997; Fein, 1993) leads to substantial 
variation in its application to different atrocities  such as mass killings, ethnic cleansings, 
political disappearances, forced removals, cultural exterminations, systematic programs of 
torture, or slavery. Moreover, the designation of genocide as the ultimate crime makes its 
identification and acknowledgment particularly challenging. Since the labeling of events as 
genocide or not determines who has committed or been the victim of the worst of all crimes, 
various actors—including perpetrators, victims, and bystanders—have strong incentive to apply 
or deny the label. The label not only carries different meanings for different parties involved, but 
also informs different types of action (e.g. reparation, retaliation, intervention).  
One implication of these observations is that despite its seemingly undisputed status in 
the hierarchy of evil deeds, what qualifies as genocide is highly ambiguous. Another implication 
is that the application of the genocide label to different acts of violence is not neutral or 
objective, but rather reflects the conflicting identity-relevant interests and power struggles of 
different groups involved.  
Taking these observations as a point of departure, the present research draws upon 
perspectives in social and cultural psychology to examine the implications of the genocide label 
for national identity, collective memory, and reparative action. More specifically, across three 
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studies I consider the extent to which different representations of historical violence as 
“genocide” serve as tools that both reflect and promote identity-relevant concerns and action.  
Before I proceed to a discussion of the present research, I begin with an overview of 
definitional and political controversies surrounding the label “genocide” and its application to 
various historical events.  I then focus the attention of the paper on theory and research in social 
and cultural psychology that examine the dynamics of national identity in construals of and 
responses to genocidal events and other acts of mass violence.    
What’s in a Name? Definitional Dilemmas 
Since Raphael Lemkin first coined the term in 1944, scholars across disciplines have 
proposed various definitions and typologies of genocide, without reaching a consensus on the 
matter. This is not only because of the difficulties inherent in conceptually bounding genocide or 
categorically differentiating it from other atrocious acts (e.g. mass murders, state terror, 
displacement, etc) but also because definitions of genocide almost always reflect prescriptive 
agendas.  
 Lemkin (1944) proposed the term “genocide” as a neologism with both Greek and Latin 
roots: the Greek “genos” (race or tribe) and the Latin “cide” (killing). Lemkin’s notion of 
genocide as an offense against international law became widely accepted and constituted a base 
for the Nuremberg trials in the aftermath of World War II.  Due to Lemkin’s active campaigning, 
the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. Article 2 of the United Nations Genocide Convention defines 
genocide as follows: 
“Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such: 
a. Killing members of the group; 
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
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c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;  
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (as cited in MacDonald, 
2008). 
 
Although the United Nations Genocide Convention  is definitive for legal purposes, 
genocide scholars problematize this definition in numerous ways (for critiques and alternatives, 
see Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Charny, 1994; Churchill, 1997; Fein, 1993, Moshman, 2001; 
Totten, Parsons, & Hitchcock, 2002).  Briefly, ongoing definitional debates revolve around 
issues of the identity of the perpetrator and target groups, the range of acts deemed genocidal, the 
distinction among different types of genocide and issues related to determining motives or intent 
for genocide. For instance, one major controversy involves conceptions of victim groups. 
Various scholars argue that the UN definition is too narrow with respect to victim groups and 
should be broadened to include other (e.g. political or economic) groups (e.g. Chalk & 
Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1993).  Another controversy concerns the range of acts that fall under the 
rubric of genocide. While in lay imagination genocide connotes the killing and extermination of 
a large number of people, the legal definition does not require that anyone die.  In Lemkin’s 
terms:  
“Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a 
nation, except when accomplished by mass killing of all members of a nation. It is 
intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions arrived at the destruction 
of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves. The objective of such a plan would be disintegration of the political 
and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, 
dignity, and the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed 
against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against 
individuals, not in their individual capacity but as members of the national group” 
(quoted in LeBlanc, 1991, p. 18). 
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From this perspective, genocide does not necessarily require acts leading to the loss of 
physical existence, but rather involves acts leading to the loss of cultural identity. On the basis of 
such distinctions, scholars have proposed various linguistic subcategories such as “ethnocide”, 
“cultural genocide”, or “politicide” to qualify and distinguish between different acts of genocidal 
violence that various groups of people have experienced throughout history.  Although 
potentially useful for purposes of conceptual clarity, scholars raise the possibility that these 
subcategories “confuse definition with degree” and propose a risky hierarchy whereby physical 
or biological forms of genocide appear as “the real thing” and non-physical or non-biological 
forms become “not real” (Wolfe, 2006).  
Besides these and other concerns related to the legal definition of genocide, one of the 
most contentious issues within genocide studies involves the conceptualization of the Jewish 
Holocaust
1
 as the defining exemplar of genocide. This is not to say that events associated with 
the Holocaust are considered typical. In fact, there is a substantial body of literature devoted to 
demonstrating the Holocaust’s uniqueness and exceptionality in world history (e.g. Bauer, 1996; 
Katz, 1998). The exemplary status of the Holocaust instead refers to its depiction within 
scholarly and popular discourse as “the ultimate expression of genocide” (Strom & Parsons, 
1982, p.1), “the most terrible event in modern history” (Weinberg, 1993, p. xiv), and an event 
that “stands alone in the history of the West and the history of genocide” (Chalk & Jonassohn, 
1990, p. 325).  
The centrality of the Holocaust to understandings of genocide is further evident in the 
title of the first academic journal devoted to the study of genocide: Holocaust and Genocide 
                                                          
1
 When scholars refer to the Holocaust (with a capital H), they often construe it in both narrow and broad terms. In 
the narrow sense, it refers to the Nazi killings of Jews during World War II. In the broader sense, the term also 
includes the Nazi killings of Poles, Romani people, homosexuals, and people with disabilities during the same era. 
While the term Holocaust extends to these different target groups, scholars often treat the Nazi Judeocide as central 
and defining (Johnson & Rittner, 1996).  
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Studies. Consistent with this title, the overwhelming focus on the Holocaust is further evident in 
the journal’s content. Of the 53 articles published in this journal between the years 1997-2000, 
48 of them focus exclusively on the Holocaust (Moshman, 2001). This pattern seems to reflect 
the general state of the field. While there is a wealth of research on numerous other genocides, 
the Holocaust appears to be the event that researchers have most extensively studied.   
Moreover, even in cases where scholars focus on other genocides in world history or study 
general processes of genocide rather than the specifics of a particular event, they tend to utilize 
the Holocaust as a central framework and treat it as the standard against which all other 
genocides are evaluated (e.g. Lerner, 1992; Staub, 1989).  
Moshman (2001, p. 432) among others argues that a Holocaust-based conception of 
genocide may serve as “the primary conceptual constraint on thinking about genocide”. To the 
extent that the Holocaust is viewed as the defining case of genocide, scholars and lay people 
alike may come to analyze other events of mass violence in terms of their similarities to and 
differences from the Holocaust. Similarly, to the extent that the Holocaust frames the 
understanding and study of genocide, people may further be reluctant to acknowledge the term’s 
applicability to other violent events. To summarize, this review suggests that the term 
“genocide” is highly ambiguous and associated with conflicting definitions in legal, scholarly, 
and everyday discourse. Moreover, the study and understanding of genocide appear to focus on 
particular world events to a disproportionate extent. Together, these observations suggest that the 
application of the term “genocide”—particularly to events that are unrelated or dissimilar to the 
presumed exemplar—might entail various challenges. The tensions related to the selective 
application of the term become amplified when we consider the politics of genocide recognition 
and denial. 
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The Power of a Word: Politics of Genocide Recognition and Denial  
Invoking the term genocide is not a mere “matter of vocabulary” (Camus, 1947/2001); it 
is an accusation of the most heinous crime and an urgent appeal for action. Genocide is a word 
with heavy moral weight and significant “ideational power” 
2
(Glanville, 2009). As such, partisan 
actors employ it or not as a strategic tool to trigger or resist particular forms of action. 
 “Genocide” is a word perpetrators seldom use, unless international authorities pressure 
them to do so. As Minow (1998) observes, in the 60 years since the United Nations Genocide 
Convention, no group has spontaneously declared themselves as perpetrators of genocide
3
. Even 
in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust– “the ultimate genocide” (Strom & Parsons, 1982) – 
Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic of Germany’s first Chancellor, avoided the term and 
resorted to euphemisms: “In our name, unspeakable crimes have been committed and demand 
compensation and restitution, both moral and material, for the persons and properties of the Jews 
who have been so seriously harmed” (cited in Brooks 1999, pp. 61–67).   
Perpetrator avoidance of genocide label. Among perpetrator groups, the stakes for 
invoking the term genocide are high and incur heavy moral, legal, and political charges.  
Acknowledging genocide involves admitting responsibility and liability for criminal actions 
punishable by international law. Aside from obligations to provide reparations and compensation 
to victims, acknowledging genocide also entails avowing one’s shameful status as hostis humani 
generis, the enemy of humankind. In the face of such hefty material and moral losses, perpetrator 
groups have strong motivations to reject the label and deny genocide. While arguably the most 
                                                          
2
 Glanville (2009) suggests that the “ideational power” of the term genocide includes not only the legal obligations 
that arise when the term is invoked, but also the social and political expectations to respond to extreme suffering.   
3
 One exception was Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda who was the first and only head of state to confess to 
genocide, which he did only after being brought to the International Criminal Tribunal and which he later attempted 
to withdraw.  
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necessary party to invoke the term among all groups involved, the perpetrator group is also the 
least likely to utter the word. 
Victim appropriation of genocide label. Employing the term “genocide” involves no 
such reservations for victim groups. In fact, there has been an unprecedented amount of focus on 
the crime of genocide by international courts in recent years due to the active lobbying of various 
victim groups.  Victims of numerous atrocities have appropriated the language of genocide to 
draw attention to the extent of their suffering and to demand recognition and legal action. For 
instance, since 1968 the American Indian Movement has applied the term genocide to events 
associated with the devastation of Indigenous communities of the Americas. In 1997, the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity commission released a report proposing that the Australian 
government’s practice of removing Aboriginal children from their parents constitutes a form of 
genocide. More recently, scholars (e.g. Cooper, 2012) have noted that US policies against 
African Americans during the Jim Crow era constitute genocide as defined by the United Nations 
convention, and they have suggested that referring to events as such can make a stronger case for 
reparations than the current discourse which frames the issue as providing compensation for the 
labor of those subjected to slavery. Needless to say, in each of these and countless other cases, 
claims of genocide by victim groups meet strong resistance. 
Aside from such cases of massive violence and human rights violations, scholars raise 
concern that various groups might have overused the term genocide to refer to any act of 
oppression. Perhaps more egregiously, numerous activist groups have misused and to some 
extent abused the term for purposes of condemning certain acts or eliciting support for their 
political causes. For instance, the term genocide has emerged in discussions of “race-mixing”, 
medical treatment of Catholics, the closing of synagogues in the Soviet Union, as well as birth 
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control and abortion practices in the United States and the Third World (Porter, 1982). Such 
misappropriations of the term not only distort its actual meaning, but further diminish and 
trivialize the significance of acts that are truly genocidal.  
Bystander perception of genocide label. Besides perpetrator and victim groups, 
invoking the term “genocide” has important implications for bystander groups. In the case of 
ongoing violence, recognition of events as “genocide” is a necessary— though not sufficient—
condition for action, while failure to invoke the term serves as a basis for avoiding intervention. 
The prime example of this concerns the Clinton administration’s reluctance to describe violence 
in Rwanda as “genocide” for fear that applying the term would trigger legal and political 
obligations to “do something” (Glanville, 2009). In the case of historical violence, bystander 
groups similarly apply or avoid the label in ways that serve their own political interests. For 
instance, in 2000, Speaker of the House Dennis Haster suspended consideration of the US House 
Resolution 596 (declaring the 1915-1923 Ottoman killings of Armenians as “genocide”) minutes 
before it was scheduled for deliberation. Commentators have noted both how House Resolution 
596 was a strategic ploy designed to help Representative James Rogan win a re-election 
campaign in California and also how Haster’s controversial move was a response to concerns 
that the resolution would hinder US-Turkey relations (Mueller, 2004). Both examples suggest 
that, although bystanders’ use of the term “genocide” may potentially serve to “prevent and 
punish” genocidal acts, whether they employ it or not depends on their particular political 
concerns.  
 Power and silence. On a final note, the politics of genocide recognition and denial are 
evident in the differential exercise of power that enables and reproduces memory of certain 
genocidal events, while silencing or repressing memory of many others. World history is replete 
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with examples of genocidal events. Among these countless cases, only particular events are 
consensually defined, documented, written into history textbooks, taught in schools, featured in 
films, and commemorated via museums, memorials, and days of remembrance as “genocide”. 
Many other similarly atrocious events remain as “crime(s) without a name”, ignored, unresolved 
or long forgotten. 
As mentioned in the previous section, scholars have observed notable asymmetries in 
discussions and representations of genocide within the field of genocide studies. Moses (2002, 
p.9) links this asymmetry within the scholarly literature on genocide to hegemonic 
Eurocentricism: 
“The genocide of European peoples in the 20
th
 century strikes many American, Anglo-
European and Israeli scholars as a more urgent research question than the genocide of 
non-Europeans by Europeans in the preceding centuries or by postcolonial states of their 
indigenous populations today”. 
 
Mazover (1995) suggests two potential reasons for this asymmetry:  
“I think there have may have been…a widely-held unspoken assumption that the mass 
killing of African or American peoples was distant and in some senses an ‘inevitable’ 
part of progress while what was genuinely shocking was the attempt to exterminate an 
entire people in Europe. This assumption may rest upon an implicit racism, or simply 
upon a failure of historical imagination”.  
 
Along more radical lines, scholars further suggest that rather than a simple “failure of 
historical imagination”, the reason for the given asymmetry might be because “genocide lies at 
the core of Western civilization” (Moses, 2002, p. 9; see also Churchill, 1997). From this 
perspective, the de-emphasis on genocides of non-Europeans by Europeans reflects and 
reproduces ongoing silence regarding the genocidal foundations of numerous Western nations. In 
other words, the study or recognition of particular genocides and the neglect or denial of others 
might constitute “two sides of the same debased coin” (Stannard, 1998).  
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In summary, the word “genocide” is a tool that various actors strategically use or refuse 
to serve their particular interests and to demand (or defuse) particular forms of action. Moreover, 
invoking and acknowledging the term are matters of identity positioning, not only within the so-
called perpetrator-victim-bystander triangle of genocide
4
 but also in the context of global power 
hierarchies.  
A Crime of Identity: Psychological Perspectives on Genocide  
The extreme forms of human violence and suffering during genocides, and particularly 
the Holocaust, have captivated the attention of numerous social psychologists and stimulated 
research on a wide range of psychological phenomena such as obedience (Milgram, 1974), 
intergroup discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), dehumanization (Bandura, 1999; Kelman, 
1973); moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1990) and role-based 
aggression (Zimbardo, 2007). Regardless of the wealth of psychological theories inspired by 
genocidal events, psychological research on actual cases of genocide remains relatively scarce.  
Some of the seminal work within psychology has addressed the origins and dynamics of 
genocide (e.g. Staub, 1989; Newman & Erber, 2002). Within this literature, scholars have 
highlighted the role of identity concerns involved in genocidal campaigns and argued that rather 
than a crime of hate, genocide is more aptly described as a “crime of identity” (Moshman, 2007, 
p.118). For instance, in a series of case studies including the Rwandan genocide, Nazi death 
camps, disappearances in Argentina, the dirty war massacre in El Salvador, and the Wounded 
                                                          
4
 While most of the literature on genocide utilizes a framework of the “genocide triangle” to distinguish between 
three major social roles or groups (i.e. perpetrators, victims, and bystanders), various scholars have noted how these 
categories may be misleading. For instance, some members of perpetrator groups may perceive themselves as 
victims (Cehajic & Brown, 2010), while many victims may have also perpetrated violent acts (Robins & Jones, 
2009). Similarly, some bystanders were also victims (Steinlauf, 1997) while others were perpetrators (Gross, 2001). 
Moreover, there are cases in which people have occupied all three roles within the context of the same genocide 
(Bauman, 2000; Perechodnik, 1996). While recognizing the extent to which an entitative and monolithic conception 
of different social groups might be misrepresentative of the multiplicity of roles that people occupy in genocidal 
incidents, I use the framework of the genocide triangle here as a tool to make contact with and organize the existing 
literature.    
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Knee Massacre in South Dakota, Moshman (2005) has noted that identity-related motivations, 
rather than hatred, play a central role in these acts of destruction. This observation strongly 
resonates with work on genocide in different disciplines where scholars have suggested that 
genocides are perpetrated by ordinary individuals acting on behalf of a social group against those 
whom they perceive to be members of another group (Arendt, 1994; Ashmore, Jussim, Wilder, & 
Heppen, 2001; Osiel, 2001; Staub, 1989, 2001, 2003; Waller, 2002; Weitz, 2003; Woolf & 
Hulsizer, 2005). The overarching implication of this body of work in psychology as well as the 
multidisciplinary field of genocide studies is that identity concerns lie at the heart of genocide.  
Identity concerns in the aftermath of genocide. In addition to examining processes 
leading to genocide, psychologists have increasingly directed their attention to the consequences 
of genocidal violence. Within this body of work, scholars have highlighted the ways in which 
being the target of genocidal violence threatens victims’ positive identity needs (e.g. Staub, 
2006) and leads to a variety of negative outcomes such as posttraumatic stress disorder, revenge, 
and intergenerational trauma (e.g. Barel, Van Ijzendoorn, Sagi-Schwartz, & Bakermans-
Kranenburg, 2010; Field & Chhim, 2008; Volkan, 2001). Researchers have similarly emphasized 
the centrality of identity concerns in processes of forgiveness, apology, healing, and 
reconciliation among victim and perpetrator groups in the aftermath of genocidal violence (e.g. 
Albeck, Adwan, & Bar-On, 2012; Bilewicz & Jaworska, 2013; Brave Heart & Lemyra, 1998; 
Paluck, 2009; Shnabel, Nadler, Ulrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & 
Hagengimama, 2005; Subasic & Reynolds, 2009). Of direct relevance to purposes of the present 
paper, researchers have examined the dynamics of identity in people’s responses to and 
construals of historical events involving genocidal violence or other forms of illegitimate 
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wrongdoing (e.g. Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 
1998). 
Identity concerns in responses to genocidal violence. A significant body of social 
psychological research has shown that when confronted with accounts of genocidal violence or 
other forms of illegitimate wrongdoing committed in the name of collective identity, people may 
experience collective guilt, even in the absence of personal responsibility for the harm done 
(Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). Feelings of guilt, arising from acknowledgment of in-
group responsibility for past harm, can in turn enhance people’s motivation for providing 
reparations to victimized groups (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Branscombe, Doosje, & 
McGarty, 2002; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; 
Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; McGarty et al., 2005).  
Research on identity dynamics in experiences of collective guilt has revealed mixed 
results. On the one hand, researchers have suggested that self-categorization as a member of the 
perpetrator group is a prerequisite for experiencing guilt and found that people who strongly 
identify with their group experience greater collective guilt in response to ingroup wrongdoing 
than do people low in identification (e.g. Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004). On 
the other hand, researchers have also found that because reminders of historical wrongdoing 
threaten one’s collective identity, people who strongly identify with the group engage in identity 
defensive strategies to maintain the group’s positive image and avoid collective guilt (e.g. 
Doosje et al., 1998).  
In response to this paradox, Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan (2004) have suggested that the 
relationship between identification and collective guilt depends on the type or meaning of 
identity. More specifically, they proposed a distinction between ingroup glorification (associated 
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with an emphasis on the superiority of the ingroup over other groups) and ingroup attachment 
(associated with connection to and a critical evaluation of the ingroup). They further argued that 
ingroup glorification might inhibit collective guilt and ingroup attachment might facilitate it. 
Numerous studies have indeed confirmed that ingroup glorification and ingroup attachment have 
opposing (negative for ingroup glorification, positive for ingroup attachment) relations to 
collective guilt and support for reparative action (e.g. Roccas et al., 2004, 2006; see also Leidner, 
Castano, Zaiser & Giner-Sorolla, 2010).  
Despite the wealth of studies on antecedents and consequences of collective guilt (see 
Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006 for a review), scholars have further noted that any form of 
self-critical sentiment regarding past generations’ genocide or other mass violence is in fact a 
relatively rare occurrence (Leach, Zeineddine, & Cehajic-Clancy, 2013). Rather than accepting 
responsibility, feeling guilty for the harmful acts one’s group has committed, and engaging in 
reparative action, the more typical response to reminders of genocidal or other forms of 
wrongdoing involves disengagement, denial, and inaction—a response that individuals achieve 
through alternative construals of events.  
Identity concerns in construals of genocidal violence. Acknowledging genocidal 
violence and accepting responsibility for the harm go against the desire to maintain a positive 
group image. Hence, when reminded of their group’s genocidal deeds, people experience a threat 
to their social identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) and engage in a variety 
of defensive processes. One strategy involves minimizing the severity or consequences of harm 
inflicted by the ingroup (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) while 
emphasizing the harm inflicted on the ingroup (Pratto & Glasford, 2008; Sullivan, Landau, 
Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012). The identity relevance of this tendency is evident in the 
 14 
observation that ingroup glorification is associated with less perceived severity of harm among 
perpetrator groups (Bilali, 2013; Roccas et al., 2006).  
Researchers further find that people—particularly if they strongly identify with their 
group—construe genocidal or other forms of violent events in ways that legitimize or justify past 
harm. For instance, they make situational attributions (rather than ingroup attributions) to explain 
in-group’s harmful actions (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). They place responsibility for the harm 
done on victims (Bilali, Tropp, & Dasgupta, 2012) or dehumanize the victims of harm (Castano 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Kofta & Slawuta, 2013). 
Construals of genocidal history in ways that minimize or legitimize past harm can in turn 
lead people to deny ingroup responsibility (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003), perceive victims as 
responsible for their fate (e.g. Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005), avoid collective guilt, and reduce 
support for reparative action (e.g. Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Wohl et al, 2006). Moreover, 
dehumanization of victims might not only justify past violence, but might even serve to glorify 
(see Ramet, 2007) and perpetuate it. The general implication of this body of work is that identity-
defensive motivations might inhibit tendencies to acknowledge wrongdoing and undermine 
reparative action which scholars consider to be crucial factors in processes of recovery and 
reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide (Staub, 2006, 2013).  
In summary, social psychological research suggests that exposing people to historical 
accounts depicting genocide or other violent events might trigger two opposing processes. On the 
one hand, exposure to genocidal accounts can promote various forms of acknowledgment and 
reparative action. On the other hand, confronting such information can elicit defensiveness, 
denial, or justification of past (perhaps even present) aggression. Moreover, identity concerns 
moderate these processes. In particular, people who show glorifying forms of identification 
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appear not only more immune to self-critical sentiment and action, but also more prone to self-
defensive strategies and (in)action.  
Congruent with disciplinary conventions, the majority of social psychological studies 
reviewed above employ experimental research methods. That is, they first expose people to 
particular varieties of historical accounts involving ingroup wrongdoing, and they then examine 
the effects of this “treatment” for psychological experience. However, one might rightfully 
contend that exposure to such critical accounts of history occurs rather infrequently outside of 
laboratory settings. Instead, as scholars of history note, most historical narratives emphasize 
collective triumphs and silence collective misdeeds (Loewen, 1995; Troulliot, 1995). This raises 
the possibility that ingroup glorification and identity-defensive strategies of disengagement and 
denial are not merely reflective of individual level processes. Instead, these identity concerns 
also reside in the cultural tools—such as mainstream representations of history— that people 
frequently encounter in their everyday worlds (see Adams, Salter, Pickett, Kurtiş, & Phillips, 
2010). By reproducing or repressing memory in identity-relevant ways, mainstream 
representations of history serve as cultural tools that regulate identity concerns at the collective 
level.  
A Cultural Psychological Approach to Collective Memory and Identity 
Psychologists have long noted a bi-directional relationship between identity and memory 
(e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Conway, 2005; Greenwald, 1980; Wilson & Ross, 2003). Most work on this 
topic has considered individual manifestations of self and the corresponding bidirectional 
relationship between personal identity and autobiographical memory. Increasingly, researchers 
have considered collective manifestations of self and examined the bidirectional relationship 
between social identity and social representations of history: repositories of collective memory 
embedded in history textbooks, memorials, museums, commemorative holidays, and other 
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structures of mind-in-society that people appropriate to reconstruct stories of the collective past 
(Liu & Hilton, 2005; Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).  
In one direction, people produce constructions of the past that bear the influence of 
present identity concerns. For instance, research (Cabecinhas & Feijó, 2010; Liu et al., 1999) 
suggests that collective memories of colonization vary as a function of identity positioning (e.g. 
former colonizer vs. colonized). Similarly, studies find that by manipulating the salience or 
intensity of social identity concerns, one can influence people to recall the collective past in more 
or less identity-enhancing ways (Sahdra & Ross, 2007).  
In the other direction, people’s experience of social identity depends on constructions of 
the collective past. Collective memories provide the content and trajectory for social identity 
(Billig, 1995; Liu & Hilton, 2005), serve as dimensions of intergroup comparison, and inform 
identity-relevant action (see the International Journal of Conflict and Violence focus section on 
collective memories, Volpato and Licata, 2010). Research suggests that by manipulating 
people’s understandings of collective historical events, one can influence the course of individual 
action on behalf of social identity (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt & Khan, 
2008).  
On the basis of these observations, a cultural psychological perspective suggests that 
mainstream representations of history serve as “intentional worlds” (Shweder, 1990, p. 1; see 
Adams et al., 2010) that mediate the relationship between collective memory and identity. In 
one direction, mainstream representations of history are not natural or objective renderings of the 
past; instead they are social products that bear the particular identity concerns of the people who 
produced them. For example, research suggests that people with high investment in national 
glorification preferentially reproduce nation-glorifying representations of the past and tend to 
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deny or silence representations that pose a threat to national identity (Kurtiş, Adams, & Yellow 
Bird, 2010). In the other direction, social representations of history are not neutral; instead, they 
carry a psychological charge that directs experience towards particular ends. For example, 
research suggests that celebratory representations of national history often promote nation-
glorifying forms of identification and action. In contrast, critical representations often promote 
less glorifying patterns of identification and action, even among people whose personal 
inclinations might lead them toward national glorification (Kurtiş et al., 2010). Together, these 
ideas suggest how mainstream representations of history serve as cultural tools for collective 
self-regulation (Wertsch, 2002; see also Vygotsky, 1978): the process by which people 
collaborate across time through cultural tools that bear traces of a person’s identity-relevant 
motivation and mediate the influence of this motivation on identity-relevant actions of others.  
Overview of Present Research 
Drawing upon theory and research in social and cultural psychology, the present research 
examines the implications of the genocide label for national identity, collective memory, and 
reparative action. Across three studies, I utilize experimental research methods to expose people 
to either critical representations of history which label events associated with ingroup 
wrongdoing as “genocide” or to sanitized representations of history which avoid the label or 
construe events as something other than “genocide”. I then examine the effects of this treatment 
for perceptions of (e.g. perceived severity and temporal distancing of harm) and responses to 
(e.g. support for reparative action and historical commemoration) historical events.  
As the previous review of social psychological theory and research suggests, a critical 
representation of historical events as “genocide” is likely to trigger two opposing processes. One 
process involves acknowledgment of harm and increased support for reparative action. The other 
process involves denial of harm and reduced support for reparative action. Moreover, 
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acknowledgment or denial of harm and support for reparative action are likely to vary as a 
function of identity concerns. People are especially likely to engage in identity-defensive 
strategies (such as denial and silencing of past harm and opposition to reparative action) when 
identity concerns are high or salient. 
On the basis of these observations, the studies address identity concerns involved in 
responses to the “genocide” label in three different ways. Besides measuring levels of 
identification, Study 1 experimentally manipulates the salience of identity concerns among a 
group of European American participants. It then observes the effects of this manipulation on 
perceptions of and responses to historical events associated with the US colonial encounter. 
Study 2 examines perceptions of and responses to historical events associated with the Spanish 
colonial encounter among participants in a Costa Rican context, where identity concerns differ in 
considerable ways from those routinely observed or reported in US settings. Study 3 
experimentally manipulates the relevance of identity concerns by asking European American 
participants to respond to historical representations depicting either own group’s or other group’s 
wrongdoing as “genocide” (or not) and examines the effects of this treatment on participants’ 
perceptions of and responses to historical events.  
In addition to examining identity concerns at the individual level, the studies draw upon a 
cultural psychological perspective which suggests that mainstream representations of history 
serve as intentional worlds that regulate identity concerns at the collective level. In other words, 
mainstream representations of history not only reflect the identity concerns (e.g. national 
glorification) of the people who (re)produce them, but further direct the subsequent identity 
concerns of people engaging them towards particular ends (e.g. patriotic citizens ready to kill or 
die for nation).  
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Applied to the present research, this perspective suggests that exposure to sanitized (e.g. 
genocide-silent) representations of history might promote denial of harm and undermine support 
for reparative action or critical commemoration, while exposure to critical (e.g. genocide-
mentioning) representations of history might promote acknowledgment of harm, support for 
reparative action, and critical commemoration—regardless of the individual intention or 
awareness of the people engaging them.  
 In order to examine these ideas, the present research exposes participants to either critical 
(i.e. genocide-mentioning) representations of history that afford acknowledgment or to sanitized 
(i.e. genocide-silent) representations that afford denial. I then examine the effects of this 
manipulation on perceptions of and responses to historical events involving genocidal violence. 
To “sanitize” representations of history or infuse them with affordances for denial, I draw upon a 
framework that comes from Cohen’s (2001) work on denial of historical violence. 
Cohen (2001) identifies three categories of collective denial mechanisms. Literal denial 
occurs when historical accounts deny that acts of violence happened (e.g. Sahdra & Ross, 2007). 
Implicatory denial occurs when historical accounts acknowledge acts of violence, but justify or 
legitimize them on ideological bases (e.g. Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Wohl & Branscombe, 
2008). Of particular relevance for the present research is a third category of collective denial 
mechanisms. Interpretive denial occurs when historical accounts acknowledge raw facts of 
historical violence but construct events in ways that make them appear less atrocious. In classic 
social psychological terms (Asch, 1948), interpretive denial does not merely result in differential 
judgment of an equally atrocious object (e.g., as in implicatory denial); instead, it results in 
different objects of judgment: representations of violence as something other than atrocity. In 
other words, interpretive denial is not simply about absence or failure to mention events related 
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to historical violence. Instead, it results from particular forms of presence or mention that 
transform potentially threatening events (e.g. “genocide”) into transgression-denying objects 
(e.g. “calamity”).  
The framework of interpretive denial is particularly relevant to ongoing debates 
surrounding definitions and (selective) applications of the “genocide” label, and it is highly 
applicable to the set of historical events the present research considers. More specifically, all 
three studies focus on historical events associated with the American colonial encounter and the 
loss of Indigenous communities and lifestyles during massive, elaborate, and long-lasting acts of 
genocidal violence. As previously noted, numerous scholars and activists describe and condemn 
historical events starting with Columbus’ 1492 voyage to the present day Americas as one of the 
most profound cases of “genocide” in world history (e.g. Churchill, 1997; Stannard, 1998). Yet, 
the use of the label “genocide” to describe colonial violence generates outrage and fierce debate 
within public as well as scholarly discourse. Various alternative accounts of the colonial 
encounter involve legitimization of violence (e. g. “frontier wars”) or dehumanization of 
Indigenous Peoples (e.g. as “savages” and “half-civilized”, see Fitzgerald, 1979). Accounts that 
acknowledge colonial violence reveal subtler instantiations of interpretive denial (e.g. loss of 
Indigenous populations by “disease”, “cultural assimilation” or “biological absorption”, see 
Ellinghaus, 2009).  
Within the first two studies, I utilize a particularly pervasive case of interpretive denial 
evident in mainstream representations of history which construe Columbus’ journey and events 
in its aftermath as “discovery” and “social change” and compare the effects of this representation 
with one that construes historical events as “genocide”. In the third study, I employ the 
euphemistic discourse of “tragedy” or “calamity” as another tool for interpretive denial in 
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descriptions of historical violence and compare the effects of this sanitized representation to a 
critical one that construes the same set of events as “genocide”.  
As previously stated, a general hypothesis for these studies suggests that exposure to 
acknowledgment-infused (i.e. genocide-mentioning) representations of history will promote 
greater perception of harm, support for reparative action, and critical commemoration. 
Conversely, exposure to (interpretive) denial-infused (i.e. genocide-silent) representations will 
undermine perception of harm, support for reparative action, and critical commemoration. 
Moreover, to the extent that critical representations of history constitute a threat to identity, one 
can hypothesize an identity-defensive reaction such that the level, salience, or relevance of 
identity pressures will induce participants to deny harm, oppose reparative action, and abstain 
from critical commemoration. 
Study 1 
Various scholars have noted the extent to which mainstream representations of US 
history present sanitized and nation-glorifying depictions of the colonial encounter and related 
historical events (e.g. Fitzgerald, 1979; Loewen, 1995; Zinn, 1980). For instance, in an analysis 
of US history textbooks, Fitzgerald (1979) finds that books published between the years 1930- 
1960s omit any mention of Indigenous Peoples. Even in more recent cases where historical 
accounts mention Indigenous presence, they frequently employ the rhetoric of “vanishing” or 
“extinction” via natural causes such as disease and starvation to explain the “disappearance” of 
Indigenous communities (Barkan, 2003). In Cohen’s (2001) typology, such explanations 
constitute discourses of interpretive denial. While acknowledging the tragic loss of Indigenous 
communities as a historical fact, they construe it as an inevitable or unintentional byproduct of 
processes leading to “development”, “nation-building” or “progress” (see MacDonald, 2008). 
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Since the 1970s, historians in the US and elsewhere have been prompted by what 
Antoinette Burton (2003) has termed “the imperial turn” and begun assessing their nations’ 
troubled myths of origin. Particularly in the early 1990s, there has been an outpouring of public 
discussion and scholarship surrounding the quincentennial of Columbus’ arrival on the North 
American continent and its implications for the beginnings of the United States as a nation. For 
instance, in 1992, anticolonial activists staged protests challenging the myth of “discovery” and 
demanding the transformation of Columbus Day into a commemoration of genocide. As a result 
of such efforts, some US cities and states (e.g., Berkeley, California and South Dakota) have 
reconstructed the holiday as a celebration of Indigenous Peoples (Kubal, 2008). 
Despite these controversies, Columbus remains a central figure of US origin myths and 
one of the two individuals (along with Martin Luther King) who warrant their own federal 
holidays. Generations of US schoolchildren continue to learn about Columbus’ voyage as a 
defining moment of US national history and global progress. When asked to reflect on the 
origins of Columbus Day, US adults frequently note that “in 1492, Columbus sailed the ocean 
blue” and “discovered America” (Kurtiş & Adams, 2012, unpublished data).  
Drawing upon these competing discourses surrounding Columbus Day, the first study 
examined the implications of different representations of Columbus’ voyage and the American 
colonial encounter for national identity and identity-relevant action. More specifically, I exposed 
participants to either a sanitized or critical representation of the US colonial encounter. The 
former portrayed Columbus' voyage and European settlement of the Americas as “one of the 
most profound cases of societal change” in recorded human history. The latter portrayed 
Columbus' voyage and European settlement of the Americas as “one of the most profound cases 
of genocide” in recorded human history. I then examined the effect of these different 
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representations on perceptions of past harm, support for reparative action, and tendency to 
reproduce a critical (versus sanitized) version of history. To the extent that critical 
representations inhibit (or sanitized representations promote) nation-glorifying action, one can 
hypothesize that perception of harm, support for reparative action, and tendencies to reproduce 
critical representations of history will be stronger in the “genocide” than "societal change" 
condition.  
Besides the description of events, I also manipulated the salience of identity pressures. 
Prior research has documented the prevalence of silencing and denial (including processes of 
forgetting, justifying or legitimizing; e.g. Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Branscombe & Miron, 
2004; Sahdra & Ross, 2007; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008) of historical wrongdoing among groups 
who have harmed other groups, particularly among people who report strong collective 
identification. To the extent that critical representations of history constitute a threat to national 
identity, one can hypothesize that the salience of identity pressures will induce participants to 
deny the severity of harm, temporally distance past harm, oppose reparative action, and 
reproduce sanitized forms of commemoration as an identity-defensive (re-) action. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were adults whom I recruited from public settings in the metropolitan area of 
a large city in the Midwestern USA. I report analyses of only the sixty-three participants (50.8% 
women, age range 18-83, median=23) who were US citizens and indicated White or European-
American in response to an item about ethnic identification. 
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Procedure 
Participants individually completed a set of paper and pencil measures. I assigned each 
participant at random to one of two historical representation conditions. In the sanitized 
condition, participants read a text entitled “Discovery and Settlement of America” that described 
Columbus’ discovery and European settlement of the Americas. This text mentioned numerous 
acts of expansion (e.g. treaties, military raids, purchases) that Americans used to accomplish 
their “manifest destiny” and described the resulting demographic transformation of the American 
continent as “societal change”. In the genocide condition, participants read a text entitled 
“History of the American Genocide” that described Columbus’ arrival and European occupation 
of the Americas. This text mentioned numerous acts of violence (e.g. wars of conquest, forced 
removal, confinement of Indigenous Peoples to reservations) in Americans’ westward expansion 
and construed the resulting demographic transformation in terms of “genocide” (see Appendix 
A). 
I also assigned each participant at random to one of two identity salience conditions. 
Participants in the identity salient condition completed a national glorification measure before 
completing other materials. Participants in the identity not salient condition completed the 
measure of national glorification after completing other materials. Other than these differences, 
participants completed the same dependent measures in the same order regardless of condition. 
After participants completed the measures, the experimenter debriefed and thanked them. 
Measures 
National glorification. I used the 8-item glorification subscale (= .81) of a 
multidimensional measure of national identity (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Glorification 
refers specifically to the identity-defensive tendency to view one's national ingroup as superior to 
 25 
other groups (e.g. “The US is better than other nations in all respects"). In previous work, 
researchers observed negative associations between glorification scores and tendencies to 
acknowledge ingroup wrongdoing, experience collective guilt, and endorse reparative action 
(Kurtiş et al., 2010; Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006). Participants used a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) to indicate their agreement with each item. 
Historical perception.  After reading the historical text for either the genocide or 
sanitized condition, participants rated four items concerning the European conquest of North 
America. For three items—(1) “How violent or brutal was the European conquest of North 
America?”, (2) “How many Indigenous people died as a direct result of European settlers’ 
actions during the conquest of North America?”, and (3) “To what extent was the collapse of 
Indigenous societies due to deliberate policies of violence by European settlers?"—participants 
indicated their response by placing an "X" on a line with endpoints of not very violent/ brutal 
and extremely violent/ brutal; few and many; and accidental byproduct and deliberate policy, 
respectively. I computed the mean of these three items to form a composite measure of perceived 
harm ( = .86). For the fourth item— "When did violence associated with the European conquest 
of North America occur?"—participants indicated their response by placing an "X" on a line with 
a right endpoint labeled today and a left-facing arrow at the left endpoint with the label distant 
past. I scored responses by measuring in centimeters the distance from the left endpoint of the 
line to the “X” participants placed.  
Support for reparative action. Participants used a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree 
and 7 = strongly agree) to indicate their agreement with 3 items I created as an index of 
reparative action ( = .75). This index included two items—“The U.S. should officially apologize 
to Native American nations for all broken treaties, illegal appropriation of land, forced 
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displacement, and massacres perpetrated against Native Americans” and “The U.S. should 
establish a National Day of Apology to memorialize and atone for suffering inflicted upon 
Native Americans”—that address positions on national apology. The index also included an 
item—“The U.S. should provide reparation and compensation for damages to Native Americans 
who were removed from their homes and forced to attend boarding schools”—that referred to 
issues of reparation and compensation to Indigenous Peoples for past harm. 
Critical commemoration. To assess participants’ tendency to reproduce critical or 
sanitized representations of history, I devised two tasks. Immediately after reading the historical 
text, participants responded in open-ended fashion to the following question: “In your opinion, 
what are the 5 most important events to commemorate during Native American History Month 
(November)”? I then created a "critical commemoration frequency" score by giving participants 
points for critical responses of Trail of Tears, Wounded Knee massacre, and Battle of Little Big 
Horn (e.g. responses which acknowledge genocidal wrongdoing against Indigenous 
communities) , but subtracting points for celebratory responses of Thanksgiving, Columbus, and 
Custer’s Last Stand (e.g. responses which sanitize genocidal wrongdoing against Indigenous 
communities). Participants also ranked 10 Native American history items in terms of importance 
for future high school students. Four of these items—Wounded Knee, Trail of Tears, King 
Philip’s War, Chief Joseph— described "critical" facts about European American wrongdoing 
against Indigenous Peoples. I created a "critical commemoration importance" score by 
computing the mean of participants' rankings for these four critical items and reverse coding it 
(so that higher numbers represent greater importance). I then created a "critical commemoration 
index" by taking the average of the standardized scores from the frequency and importance 
indices. 
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Results 
To evaluate hypotheses, I conducted multiple regression analyses with glorification score, 
glorification salience (0 = not salient, 1 = glorification salient), historical representation (0 = 
sanitized, 1 = genocide), and their interaction terms as predictors of each outcome. I included 
participant gender and age as covariates in all analyses. Means and standard deviations as a 
function of condition appear in Table 1. Correlations between variables appear in Table 2. 
Historical Perception 
Perception of harm. Analyses revealed no effects of glorification score on perception of 
harm, b= -0.99, se= 0.95, p=0.30.  
 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations 
 Sanitized (n=35) Genocide (n=28) 
 Glorification 
not Salient 
Glorification 
Salient 
Glorification 
not Salient 
Glorification 
Salient 
Glorification Score 3.12 (0.91) 3.92 (1.13) 3.73 (1.31) 3.60 (0.80) 
Perception of Harm 38.59 (5.86) 32.48 (10.64) 39.64 (5.82) 39.81 (6.62) 
Time of Harm 10.33 (3.12) 9.84 (3.54) 11.34 (3.07) 9.77 (5.36) 
Reparative Action 3.96 (1.66) 3.08 (1.62) 2.64 (1.55) 3.59 (1.30) 
Critical Commemoration -0.12 (0.62) 0.03 (0.87) 0.58 (0.65) -0.29 (0.74) 
Note: Cells include means (with standard deviation in parentheses). 
Analyses for the index of perception of harm revealed hypothesized main effects of 
historical representation, b=4.41, se=1.90, p=.024, and glorification salience, b=-3.85, se=1.91, 
p=.049. Perception of harm was greater in the genocide condition than the sanitized condition 
and lower in the glorification salient condition than the not salient condition. A Historical 
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Representation X Glorification Salience interaction qualified these effects, b=7.79, se=3.84, 
p=.048. A series of simple and complex orthogonal contrasts revealed that participants  in the 
glorification salient condition who read the sanitized text perceived less harm than did 
participants in other conditions, b=2.20, se=0.74, p= .004 (Figure 1). There were no statistically 
significant differences in perception of harm among participants in other conditions, ps>.1. 
 
Figure 1: Effects of historical representation and identity salience on perception of harm 
 
One interpretation of this pattern is that representation of the colonial encounter as 
genocide was sufficiently powerful to promote perception of harm, despite the salience of 
glorification pressures that would otherwise promote denial of harm. A slightly different 
interpretation is that even the content of the sanitized condition was still sufficiently 
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consciousness-raising that it led to perception of harm in the absence of glorification salience, 
but not sufficiently so to overcome the denial-promoting effects of glorification salience. There 
were no additional main effects or interactions for this measure, ps>.1.  
Time of harm. Analyses for the measure of perceived time of harm revealed no effects 
of historical representation, b=-0.02, se= 1.05, p= .98 or glorification salience, b= -1.26, se= 
1.05, p= 0.25. The interaction of historical representation by glorification salience was further 
non-significant, b= -0.98, se= 2.30, p= .67. However, analyses for the measure of perceived time 
of harm did reveal a main effect of glorification score, b=1.17, se=0.52, p=.028. Consistent with 
the identity-relevance hypothesis and previous research on subjective temporal distancing (e.g., 
Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2003), higher scores on the glorification measure 
were associated with greater temporal distancing of past harm. There were no other significant 
effects, ps>.1.  
Support for Reparative Action 
Analyses for the measure of support for reparative action revealed no main effects or 
interactions, ps>.1. Thus, results of these analyses provided no support for the hypothesis that a 
critical representation of the US colonial encounter as genocide might have a direct effect of 
increasing support for reparative action. However, as previously noted, research on collective 
guilt suggests that the genocide representation of Columbus' voyage and subsequent European 
occupation triggers two responses with opposing implications for support of reparative action. 
On one hand, the genocide representation portrays European occupation in a bad light that is 
potentially threatening to European American identity. As a result, people may resist this 
representation and indicate less support for reparative action as an identity-defensive reaction 
(Doosje et al., 1998). On the other hand, the genocide representation leads to greater perception 
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of harm, which—in the absence of denial-promoting, identity-defensive motivations—may 
promote greater sense of need that motivates greater support for reparative action. To test this 
indirect effect of the genocide representation on support for reparative action through its effect 
on perceived harm, I computed bootstrapped confidence intervals (following the 
recommendations of Shrout & Bolger, 2002) using only the data from participants in the 
glorification salient condition (i.e., the condition for which I observed a significant effect of the 
historical representation manipulation). Results confirmed a significant indirect effect (see 
Figure 2). This provides some evidence that the genocide (but not the sanitized) text preserved 
perception of harm, and therefore support for reparative action, in a context (i.e., glorification 
salience) that otherwise promotes denial of harm and opposition to reparative action. 
Table 2. Correlations Among Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Glorification -     
2 Severity -0.16 -    
3 Time of Harm 0.31* 0.36** -   
4 Reparative Action -0.29* 0.58** -0.28* -  
5 Critical Commemoration -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.26* - 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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Figure 2: Indirect effect of historical representation on support for reparative action in the 
glorification salient condition 
 
Critical Commemoration 
Analyses of the critical commemoration index revealed significant interactions of 
historical representation with the glorification salience manipulation, b=-0.98, se=0.38, p=.013 
and with glorification score, b=-0.39, se=0.19, p=.048. There were no other main effects or 
interactions, ps>.1. Regarding the former interaction, I examined the effects of the historical 
representation manipulation on critical commemoration in glorification salient and not salient 
conditions. The hypothesized effect of the genocide representation (i.e. eliciting more critical 
commemoration than the sanitized text) was absent in the glorification salient condition, b=-0.29, 
se=0.24, p= 0.24 but present in the not salient condition, b= .70, se=0.29, p=.02 (Figure 3). 
Results revealed a parallel pattern for the latter interaction. Simple slope analyses revealed that 
the hypothesized effect of the genocide representation was absent among participants who scored 
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high in glorification, b=-.37, se=0.27, p= .17, but strong among participants who scored low in 
glorification, b= .60, se=0.28, p=.03 (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 3: Effects of historical representation and identity salience on critical commemoration  
 
Figure 4: Effects of historical representation and glorification score on critical commemoration  
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The consistent interpretation across these interactions concerns the moderating effect of 
identity concerns on the effectiveness of the genocide framing in fostering critical 
commemoration. In the absence of glorification pressures, the effect of the genocide framing is 
to promote greater commemoration of critical history than more sanitized framings promote. 
However, this effect of the genocide framing disappears under the pressure of high glorification 
concerns (whether as a dispositional difference or the result of experimental manipulation).  
Discussion 
To summarize, Study 1 examined the implications of different representations of the 
American colonial encounter for national identity and identity-relevant action. Participants 
exposed to the “genocide” representation perceived greater severity of harm and indicated 
greater support for reparative action (indirectly via perceived severity of harm) than participants 
exposed to the “societal change” representation, even in a context (i.e. glorification salience) that 
otherwise promotes denial of harm and opposition to reparative action. The findings further 
suggest that participants reproduced critical versions of history as a function of exposure to the 
“genocide” representation, but only when identity concerns were not active. When identity 
concerns were active—whether via an identity salience manipulation or as an individual 
disposition (as measured by glorification score)—participants tended to reproduce sanitized 
versions of history that omitted instances of violence, presumably in service of the need to 
maintain a positive social identity. They did so even when they were exposed to a description of 
historical violence—in terms of “genocide”—that otherwise would promote more critical forms 
of commemoration.  
In short, these findings suggest that, relative to sanitized representations of history, 
critical representations of history which invoke the label “genocide” to refer to the European 
conquest and occupation of Americas may overcome denial and opposition to reparative action. 
 34 
Moreover, while the genocide framing of history may foster critical commemoration in the 
absence of identity concerns, this facilitating effect of the “genocide” label disappears due to 
identity-defensive pressures of glorification. 
One of the limitations of the present study is that the texts I used as an experimental 
manipulation vary in ways other than the application of the label “genocide” and do not precisely 
instantiate the conceptual difference between literal and interpretive denial. Studies 2 and 3 
address this limitation.  
Another limitation is the restriction of focus to glorification aspects of national 
identification. I focused on this aspect of national identification because previous research has 
associated it with ego-defensive patterns of perception and experience (Kurtiş et al., 2010; 
Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006); however, other aspects of national identification—for 
example, attachment (Roccas et al., 2006) or patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989)—might 
be associated with more self-critical forms of perception and action. Beyond different 
dimensions of identification, a particularly important limitation from a cultural psychological 
perspective is the fact that the present study does not direct attention to more qualitative forms of 
variation in the meaning of national identity (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Vope, 2004; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As the majority of research on national identity takes place in North 
American or European settler societies, prevailing constructions of national identity within 
psychology reflect particular sociocultural, historical, and ideological processes and often 
obscure the multiplicity in the meaning or constructions of national identity (Hammack, 2008). 
In an attempt to address some of these limitations, Study 2 involves a conceptual replication of 
the present study in another national setting (Costa Rica) where different identity dynamics are at 
play. 
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Study 2 
The quincentennial of Columbus’ arrival to the Americas has similarly sparked much 
discussion within public and scholarly discourse across “Latin America”
5
. In more recent years, 
various activist groups within the region have staged protests and condemned events associated 
with the colonial encounter as “genocide”. In part due to these controversies, October 12
th
—
which officially marks “Columbus Day” across many parts of the United States—corresponds to 
a variety of commemorations among Latin American nations, including Día de la Resistencia 
Indígena (“Day of Indigenous Resistance”) in Venezuela; Día de las Américas (“Day of the 
Americas”) in Uruguay and Belize; Día de la Raza (“Day of the Race”) in various countries such 
as Mexico, Chile, and Columbia; and Día de las Culturas (“Day of the Cultures”) in Costa Rica. 
The multiplicity in commemorations of Columbus’ voyage reveals the fact that constructions of 
the colonial encounter vary across time and space within Latin America as they do in North 
America. Moreover, these alternative commemorations suggest that the appropriation of 
Columbus’ voyage in Latin American historical narratives differs in considerable ways from its 
treatment in North American, and in particular, US history.  
As I previously noted, US historical accounts often frame Columbus’ voyage as a myth 
of “discovery” and a defining moment of national history and global progress. In contrast, 
scholars suggest how historical representations of the colonial encounter in various Latin 
American settings construe events associated with Columbus’ voyage as an “encounter between 
two worlds” (Carretero, Jacot, & López-Manjón, 2002; Zea, 1989) rather than a case of 
                                                          
5
 While cognizant of the imperial-colonial invention of the idea of “Latin America” (e.g. see Mignolo, 2005), I use 
the phrase here to engage with scholarly literature on the region and  in particular with discussions in decolonial 
theory which link the emergence of “Latin America” to the emergence of  both “Europe” and  the “United States of 
America”.  
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discovery. Moreover, while Latin American national narratives keep memory of Columbus’ 
voyage alive, they often treat it with ambivalence (Trouillot, 1990).  
Trouillot (1990) suggests these observed differences in constructions of the colonial 
encounter and appropriations of Columbus may be due to two related processes. The first 
concerns differences in the nature of the colonial encounter across North and South America. 
Although the Spanish colonial encounter was brutal, it did not reduce the Indigenous populations 
as extensively as the Anglo colonial encounter did in North America. Second, the dominant 
ideologies of race and ethnicity within North America, in particular the US, exclude 
Indigenousness to a large extent and instead emphasize continuities with the Old World (see also 
“American=White?”, Devos & Banaji, 2005). In contrast, reflecting the historical narrative of 
“encounter of worlds”, ideologies of race and ethnicity across Latin American settings often 
include some form of indigenismo and employ metaphors of “blending” (Momer, 1967) to 
emphasize the formation of new identity categories (e.g. criollos, mestizos). Scholars have 
observed how notions of heterogeneity and plasticity similarly constitute recurring themes within 
Latin American constructions of national identity (Miller, 2006). Together, these processes 
suggest that the pressures to forget or deny genocidal wrongdoing against Indigenous 
communities may be less crucial to nation-making within Latin American settings (Renan, 
1990). To the extent that national origin myths present less glorifying accounts of Columbus’ 
journey and the colonial encounter, this further raises the possibility national identities within 
Latin American settings also take less glorifying forms in comparison to the US.  
On the basis of these general observations, Study 2 turned its attention to a particular 
national setting in Latin America: Costa Rica. Columbus landed on the present-day Puerto 
Limón during his 4
th
 voyage to the Americas in 1502. Historical accounts suggest that when he 
 37 
encountered local Indigenous Peoples wearing gold necklaces and breastplates, Columbus falsely 
assumed he arrived at a land of great wealth and named the place Costa Rica (“Rich Coast”)
6
. 
Historical accounts further suggest that more than 90 percent of Indigenous populations in Costa 
Rica had fallen by the end of the 16
th
 century. 
One of the most racially homogenous nations within Latin America, Costa Rica today 
prides itself on its exceptionalism within Central America along various dimensions (e.g. 
democracy, overall level of human development, nonviolent tradition). Cruz (2000) traces the 
origins of the idea of Costa Rican exceptionalism to Costa Rica’s colonial history. In particular, 
Cruz (2000) notes the prevalence of interpretive denial (Cohen, 2001) in historical depictions of 
Costa Rica’s conquest as “peaceful”, “nonviolent”, “happy” and “conciliatory”. He further 
suggests that postcolonial elites have appropriated and reproduced these notions in order to claim 
a national “tradition” of “civility” and to garner support for their political agendas such as 
improving the prospects for national unity and a common developmental agenda.  
Drawing upon these insights, Study 2 considered the implications of different 
representations of Columbus’ voyage and the American colonial encounter for Costa Rican 
identity and identity relevant action. Similar to Study 1, this exploratory study exposed 
participants to sanitized (e.g. genocide-silent) versus critical (e.g. genocide-mentioning) 
representations of the colonial encounter. The sanitized representation construed Columbus’ 
voyage and European settlement of the Americas as “one of the most profound cases of societal 
change” in recorded human history. The critical representation construed Columbus’ voyage and 
European settlement of the Americas as “one of the most profound cases of genocide” in 
recorded human history. I then examined the effects for perceptions of harm, national 
                                                          
6
 The irony is that Columbus, who erroneously assumed he had landed in India, was also misguided in his naming of 
the land. Spanish conquistadores and settlers who went to Costa Rica in hopes of attaining mineral wealth found 
very little of it during the colonial era.  
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identification, and support for Indigenous rights policy. As in Study 1, a guiding hypothesis is 
that the “genocide” representation will elicit greater support for Indigenous rights policy 
compared to the “societal change” condition (perhaps by affording greater perception of harm). 
Besides effects on support for policy, previous research and the theoretical framework 
that I outlined earlier suggests that the “genocide” representation can also constitute a threat to 
national identity. However, I propose that the implications of this threat may vary across national 
settings. In national settings such as the US, relatively glorifying constructions of national 
identity may constitute a kind of cultural affordance for identity centrality that makes it relatively 
difficult to dis-identify in the face of threats to national identity. In the absence of affordances for 
dis-identification, people in US settings may be especially likely to react against the genocide 
label, deny harm, and report less support for Indigenous rights policy. However, discussions in 
settings such as Costa Rica suggest that constructions of national identity are less strongly 
glorifying and do not afford identity centrality to the same degree as in US settings. This implies 
that the decreased cultural-psychological emphasis on identity centrality in Costa Rican settings 
may afford dis-identification in the context of identity threat (see Powell, Branscombe, & 
Schmitt, 2005). Accordingly, one can anticipate that framing the colonial encounter as 
“genocide” (i.e., a threat to national identity) will be especially likely to lead to national dis-
identification in Costa Rican settings. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 43 Costa Rican citizens (40% female, age range 18-44, mean=24) 
recruited from public settings in the metropolitan area in San Jose, the capital city of Costa Rica.  
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Procedure 
Two research assistants (both of whom were native speakers of Spanish) approached 
participants in various public settings and invited them to participate in a study on perceptions of 
historical and current events. Participants who agreed to participate individually completed a set 
of paper and pencil measures in Spanish.  
Participants were assigned at random to one of two historical representation conditions. In 
the sanitized condition, participants read a text entitled “The Spanish Discovery and Settlement of 
the Americas”. This text described events associated with Columbus’ arrival and European 
settlement as “conquest, settlement, and political rule over much of the Western hemisphere” and 
framed the resulting demographic transformation of the continent as “societal progress”. In the 
genocide condition, participants read a text entitled “The Spanish Conquest and Genocide of the 
Americas” that described the exact same set of events as “conquest, destruction, and political rule 
over much of the Western hemisphere” and framed the resulting demographic transformation of 
the Americas as “genocide” (see Appendix B). Other than these differences, participants 
completed the same dependent measures in the same order regardless of condition. After 
participants completed the measures, the experimenters debriefed and thanked them. 
Measures 
Historical perception. After reading the historical text for either the genocide or 
sanitized condition, participants rated the same four items assessing concerning the European 
conquest of the Americas as in Study 1. I computed the mean of the first three items to form a 
composite measure of perceived severity of harm ( = .72). The fourth item assessed the 
temporal distancing of harm. 
National identification. In order to assess identity concerns, Study 1 (and Study 3) 
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focused on national glorification which is a type of national identification emphasizing ingroup 
superiority. This is because previous theory and research have highlighted the prevalence of 
nationalism or national glorification within US contexts and linked it to various identity-relevant 
outcomes. However, scholars who have examined the experience of national identity across 
Latin American settings have suggested that the idea of “nationalism” or a conscious political 
commitment to nationalist action might not be a key experience within Latin America (Miller, 
2006). Besides potential differences in the conceptualization or experience of national identity, 
the content of the national glorification scale is further not relevant to the Costa Rican context. 
As an example, one of the items of the national glorification scale (e.g. “The US Army is the best 
army in the world”) is not applicable to the Costa Rican context, given that Costa Rica does not 
have a military force. 
On the basis of these concerns, I opted for a relatively more etic measure of identity. I 
adapted two subscales of the Collective Self Esteem measure to assess participants’ national 
identification (CSE; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). The CSE private regard subscale assesses 
positive assessment of national identity (e.g., In general, I’m glad to be a member of my national 
group; Cronbach’s α = .75). The CSE identity centrality subscale measures importance of 
national identity to one’s self-concept (e.g., The national group I belong to is an important 
reflection of who I am; α = .68). Participants used a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all and 7 = 
very much) to indicate their agreement with each item. 
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Support for Indigenous rights. Participants indicated their support for Indigenous rights 
by responding to 5 items
7
 (α = .75) on topics related to providing Indigenous communities with 
reparations, job opportunities, health care facilities, agricultural credit, and land rights using a 7-
point Likert scale (0=strongly disagree and 6= strongly agree).  
Results 
To evaluate hypotheses, I conducted independent samples t-tests. Means and standard 
deviations as a function of condition appear in Table 3. Correlations between variables appear in 
Table 4. 
Historical Perception 
I conducted an independent samples t-test to compare perceived severity of harm in 
sanitized and genocide conditions. Results revealed that there were no differences in perceived 
severity of harm among experimental conditions, t (41) = .23, p= .82. In other words, results 
failed to support the hypothesis that the “genocide” framing of the colonial encounter would 
elicit greater perception of harm. Moreover, there was no effect of the historical representation 
manipulation on participants’ temporal distancing of harm, t (41) = .39, p=.70. 
  
                                                          
7
 These items were part of a larger measure assessing support for various policies (see Appendix B).  I retained and 
created an index of five items assessing support for Indigenous rights based on the results of a principal components 
analysis with varimax rotation.   
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations 
Variables Sanitized 
(n=20) 
Genocide 
(n=23) 
Private Regard 6.51 (0.81) 6.51 (0.76) 
Identity Centrality 5.29 (1.41) 4.08 (1.24) 
Severity of Harm 13.96 (2.77) 14.16 (2.95) 
Time of Harm 4.33 (5.49) 3.66 (5.68) 
Indigenous Rights 5.12 (1.24) 5.60 (0.61) 
Note: Cells include means (with standard deviation in parentheses). 
 
National Identification 
Results of an independent samples t-test revealed no effect of the historical representation 
manipulation on the private regard dimension of the national identification scale, t (41) =.02, p= 
.98. However, there was an effect of historical representation on the centrality dimension of the 
national identification scale, t (41) = 2.987, p=0.01. Participants in the genocide condition 
(M=4.08, SD=1.24) condition scored lower on identity centrality than participants in the 
sanitized condition (M=5.29, SD=1.41). Although participants did not differ in their positive 
assessment of Costa Rican identity, the “genocide” representation of the colonial encounter 
reduced the importance of being Costa Rican to their self-concept. As anticipated, the framing of 
the colonial encounter as “genocide” led to national dis-identification. 
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Table 4. Correlations Among Variables, Study 2 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Private Regard -     
2. Identity Centrality 0.13 -    
3. Severity of Harm 0.04 -0.06 -   
4. Time of Harm -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -  
5. Indigenous Rights 0.07 0.30* -0.07 -0.26 - 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
      
Support for Indigenous Rights 
An independent sample t-test analysis revealed no significant effects of historical 
representation on support for Indigenous rights policy, t (41) = 1.65, p= .11. Thus, results of 
these analyses provided no support for the hypothesis that a critical representation of the colonial 
encounter as genocide has a direct effect of increasing support for reparative action.  
Previous research and the theoretical framework I presented earlier suggest that the 
genocide representation of the colonial encounter may trigger two responses with opposing 
implications for support of reparative action. On one hand, the genocide representation affords 
greater support for reparative action. On the other hand, because the genocide representation 
threatens national identity, people may indicate less support for reparative action as an identity-
defensive reaction (e.g. Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007). To account for both of 
these responses, I examined the effects of historical representation and national identification 
(i.e. identity centrality) on support for Indigenous rights policy simultaneously.  
Results of a multiple regression analysis with historical representation and identity 
centrality as simultaneous predictors of policy support revealed the hypothesized effect of 
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historical representation on support for Indigenous rights policy. In other words, the genocide 
representation facilitated greater support for reparative action, b=0.884, se=0.289, p=0.004. 
Analyses further suggested that identity centrality positively predicted support for Indigenous 
rights policy, b=0.482, se= 0.146, p= 0.002. This finding is remarkable for several reasons. First, 
it contradicts previous research which reports a negative relationship between national 
identification and support for reparative action in response to reminders of historical 
wrongdoing. Second, it is consistent with discussions regarding the multidimensionality of 
national identity. In particular, findings suggest that identity centrality may be akin to national 
attachment (Roccas et al., 2006) which emphasizes connection to and a critical evaluation of the 
nation. Besides differences in dimensions of national identification, results further point to 
potential differences in the meaning and dynamics of national identity across Costa Rican and 
US settings.  
Apart from these interesting theoretical implications, the positive relationship between 
identity centrality and support for Indigenous rights policy suggests one reason for the failure to 
observe the hypothesized effect of the genocide representation on policy support. Namely, the  
effect of the genocide manipulation on identity centrality may exert an indirect effect of the 
manipulation on decreased policy support. This indirect effect may suppress the effect of the 
manipulation on increased policy support. To explore this possibility, I computed bootstrapped 
confidence intervals to test the indirect effect of the genocide representation on support for 
Indigenous rights policy through its effect on identity centrality. Results confirmed a significant 
indirect effect (see Figure 5), which indicates suppression rather than mediation. The genocide 
representation led to a decrease in identity centrality. Because identity centrality is positively 
associated with support for Indigenous rights policy, the decrease in identity centrality in turn 
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reduced support for Indigenous rights. In other words, the hypothesized, facilitating effect of the 
genocide framing becomes apparent when one accounts for the simultaneous, suppressing effect 
of the genocide framing (in this Costa Rican context) through its effects on identity centrality. 
 
Figure 5. Indirect effect of historical representation on support for Indigenous rights policy 
 
 
Discussion 
In summary, Study 2 examined the implications of different representations of the 
American colonial encounter for national identity and identity-relevant action in the Costa Rican 
context. The results failed to support the hypothesis that the representation of the colonial 
encounter as “genocide” might elicit greater perception of harm and support for Indigenous 
rights. However, the “genocide” representation did lead to national dis-identification. Given the 
positive association between national identification (i.e. identity centrality) and support for 
Indigenous rights policy, the drop in national dis-identification in response to the “genocide” 
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label in turn reduced participants’ support for Indigenous rights policy. Accounting for this 
indirect effect, findings did reveal the hypothesized, facilitating effect of genocide representation 
on policy support. However, since this pattern emerged only after controlling for the indirect 
effect, one should interpret with this finding with caution.  
One interesting implication of these findings is that unlike high levels of national 
identification (i.e. ingroup glorification) which previous research has associated with reduced 
tendencies to support for reparative action, high levels of national identification (i.e. identity 
centrality) in the Costa Rican context promote support for reparative action. However, it is not 
possible to evaluate whether these different patterns might reflect differences in the particular 
types of identification (e.g. national glorification versus identity centrality) or the local 
experience of national identity in the Costa Rican context. A question for future research 
involves local constructions and dimensions of Costa Rican national identity and their 
implications for identity-relevant action. 
Another limitation of the present study concerns the texts that I used as alternative 
representations of the colonial encounter. Unlike Study 1, I used identical descriptions of 
historical events in Study 2, but varied the framing of events for purposes of experimental 
control. Moreover, in order to keep two texts parallel, the description of events focused on the 
disappearance of Indigenous populations and did not mention specific acts of historical violence, 
even in the “genocide” condition. One can anticipate that different representations that explicitly 
mention violent events may produce stronger effects on perceptions of harm and reparative 
action than I observed in the present study. Study 3 addresses these concerns by incorporating 
mentions of historical violence in both (“genocide” and “sanitized”) sets of historical 
representations.  
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Study 3 
In the previous studies, I used different strategies to examine identity concerns in 
perceptions of and responses to different historical representations. In Study 1, I experimentally 
manipulated the salience of identity concerns and observed the effects of this manipulation on 
perceptions of and responses to historical events associated with the American colonial 
encounter. In Study 2, I examined perceptions of and responses to historical events associated 
with the American colonial encounter in a different national context. In both of these studies, 
different historical representations referred to own group’s history. Study 3 similarly addressed 
identity concerns involved in perceptions of and responses to different historical representations 
via yet another strategy. Rather than making identity concerns salient or measuring identity 
concerns in a different national context, Study 3 experimentally manipulated the relevance of 
identity concerns by exposing European American participants to different representations of 
either own-group or other-group wrongdoing which construed historical violence as either 
“social change” or “genocide”.  
Similar to Study 2, the historical representations in the present study attempted to 
instantiate interpretive denial via the use of euphemistic labeling. However, unlike Study 2 
which omitted mention of violent events, Study 3 depicted numerous acts of violence (e.g. 
massacres, attacks, forced displacement). The sanitized text referred to historical events as the 
“calamity” and “catastrophe”, while the critical text framed the same set of historical events as 
“holocaust” and “genocide”. I then examined effects for perceptions of harm and reparative 
action.  
A general hypothesis for this study suggests that perception of harm and support for 
reparative action will be stronger in the “genocide” than “calamity” condition. A second 
hypothesis suggests that participants might deny harm and oppose reparative action as an 
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identity-defensive reaction. Accordingly, one can predict that the identity relevance of historical 
wrongdoing will induce participants to deny harm and oppose reparative action. Finally, one can 
hypothesize that the “genocide” label will elicit greater perception of harm and support for 
reparative action when it refers to other group’s wrongdoing than when it refers to own group’s 
wrongdoing.  
Method 
Participants  
Participants included undergraduate students who received partial course credit for 
participation in the study. I report analyses of only the sixty-nine participants (51% women, age 
range 18-26, mean=19.25) who indicated US citizenship and reported White or European-
American ethnic identification. 
Procedure 
Participants individually completed a set of paper and pencil measures. Participants first 
completed a national glorification measure before completing other materials. I then assigned 
each participant at random to one of two historical representation conditions. In the sanitized 
condition, participants read a short text describing numerous acts of violence (e.g. massacres, 
attacks, forced displacement) and framed these acts as “calamity” and “catastrophe”. In the 
genocide condition, participants read a text which framed the same violent acts as “genocide” 
and “holocaust”.  
I also assigned each participant at random to one of two identity relevance conditions. 
Participants in the own group condition read a version of the text describing aforementioned acts 
of violence committed by European settlers against Indigenous Peoples. Participants in the other 
group condition read a version of the text describing acts of violence against Armenians 
committed by the Ottoman State. Other than these differences, participants completed the same 
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dependent measures in the same order regardless of condition. After participants completed the 
measures, the experimenter debriefed and thanked them. 
Measures 
National glorification. Prior to reading the historical text, participants first completed 
the same 8-item measure of national glorification ( =.88) used in Study 1 (Roccas et al., 2006). 
Historical perception. After reading the “sanitized” or “genocide” text describing own-
group or other-group violence, participants rated seven items assessing their perception of harm. 
The participants completed the same four items used in the previous studies, where three items 
(=.74) assessed participants’ perception of harm and one item assessed participants’ temporal 
distancing of harm. In addition to these four items, participants responded to three different items 
assessing denial of harm. One item assessed participants’ perception of the extent to which the 
victim group constituted a threat (“To what extent did the Indigenous/Armenian communities 
pose a threat to the European settlers/ Ottoman State?”). Another item assessed participants’ 
perceived bi-directionality of harm (“To what extent was the violence bi-directional?”). Finally, 
another item assessed participants’ perception of the relevance of past harm to present day 
realities (“To what extent is the past treatment of Native Americans/ Armenians relevant to 
present day realities?”) 
Support for reparative action. Participants used a 7-point scale (0 = strongly disagree 
and 6 = strongly agree) to indicate their agreement with 3 items I created as an index of 
reparative action (= .75) including two items on apology and one item on providing reparation 
and compensation for damages to Native Americans/Armenians for past harm. 
Results 
To evaluate hypotheses, I conducted the same set of analyses as in Study 1. More 
specifically, I used multiple regression analyses with glorification score, identity relevance (0 = 
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own group, 1 =other group), historical representation (0 = calamity, 1 = genocide), and their 
interaction terms as predictors of each outcome
8
. All interactions were probed and interpreted 
using simple slopes (Preacher, Curran, & Hayes, 2006). Means and standard deviations as a 
function of condition appear in Table 5. Correlations between variables appear in Table 6. 
Historical Perception  
Perception of harm. Analyses for perception of harm revealed no main effects or 
interactions, ps>.1. Inconsistent with predictions, findings suggested that participants did not 
differ in their perception of harm, regardless of glorification score, the framing of violence and 
whether the perpetrator was own or other group. 
Time of harm. Analyses revealed a significant effect of glorification score on perceived 
time of harm, b=-0.76, se= 0.37, p= .05, suggesting that participants high in glorification 
engaged in greater temporal distancing of past harm. There no main effects of historical 
representation or identity relevance and none of the interactions was significant, ps>.1. 
Perceived threat. Analyses for perceived threat further revealed no main effects or 
interactions, ps>.1 (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations). In other words, participants 
did not differ in their perception of the extent to which the victimized group posed a threat to the 
perpetrator group. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 In a parallel set of analyses, I conducted a two-way ANCOVA with historical representation (calamity vs. 
genocide) and identity relevance (own group vs. other group) as the between-participants factors and glorification 
score as a co-variate. These analyses revealed similar results. I report results of the MLR analyses here for purposes 
of consistency with the previous studies. I indicate any differences that the ANCOVA test revealed in a footnote.   
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Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations  
 Calamity (n=32) Genocide (n=37) 
 Indigenous 
(n=15) 
Armenian 
(n=17) 
Indigenous 
(n=22) 
Armenian 
(n=15) 
Glorification 4.03 (0.99) 4.12 (0.73) 3.94 (0.96) 4.13 (0.80) 
Severity 11.49 (1.12) 10.62 (3.18) 11.58 (2.23) 11.92 (3.45) 
Time 4.17 (3.40) 3.39 (2.80) 4.59 (2.89) 5.55 (3.56) 
Threat 4.91 (2.89) 4.95 (2.96) 5.63 (3.19) 4.39 (3.36) 
Bidirectionality 6.87 (2.28) 6.25 (3.57) 8.27 (2.35) 4.97 (3.05) 
Relevance 8.80 (2.55) 7.51 (4.01) 7.94 (3.90) 10.24 (3.31) 
Reparative Action 4.42 (1.03) 3.41 (1.29) 3.64 (1.15) 4.09 (0.86) 
Note: Cells include means (with standard deviation in parentheses). 
 
Table 6. Correlations Among Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Glorification -       
2 Severity 0.03 -      
3 Time of Harm -0.24* 0.03 -     
4 Threat 0.04 -0.10 0.19 -    
5 Bidirectionality of Harm 0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.32** -   
6 Relevance of Harm -0.27* 0.26* 0.19 0.08 -0.05 -  
7 Reparative Action -0.24 0.03 0.25* -0.03 -0.14 0.19 - 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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Bidirectionality of harm. Analyses for bidirectionality of harm revealed no main effects 
of glorification score, b=.43, se=.35, p= .23 or historical representation, b=.16, se= .70, p= .82. 
However, analyses did reveal a main effect of identity relevance, b=-2.10, se=0.71, p=.004. 
Consistent with predictions, participants perceived own group’s wrongdoing as more 
bidirectional (M=7.70, SD=2.40) than other group’s wrongdoing (M=5.65, SD=3.35). A 
marginally significant Identity Relevance X Historical Representation interaction qualified this 
effect, b= -2.52, se= 1.36, p= .068 (Figure 6)
9
. To probe this interaction, I conducted two parallel 
sets of analyses
10
. First, I examined the effects of the historical manipulation on perceived 
bidirectionality of harm separately within the own and other group conditions. Next I examined 
the effects of the identity relevance manipulation on perceived bidirectionality of harm 
separately within the calamity and genocide conditions. The first analysis did not reveal 
statistically significant effects of the Historical Representation manipulation on perceived 
bidirectionality of harm within own versus other group. The second analysis revealed that among 
those participants in the “calamity” condition, the Identity Relevance manipulation had no effect 
on perceived bidirectionality of harm, b= -.76, se=0.98, p= .45. Among those participants in the 
“genocide” condition, the identity relevance manipulation did have an effect, b=-3.27, se= 0.94, 
p= .001. Participants perceived own group’s genocide (M=8.27, SD= 2.35) as more bi-
directional than other group’s genocide (M=4.97, SD=3.05). In Cohen’s (2001) terminology, this 
finding suggests that when exposed to critical representations of own group’s wrongdoing, 
                                                          
9
 Results of the ANCOVA test similarly revealed a main effect of identity relevance on bidirectionality, F (1, 69) = 
8.64, p= 0.005. Participants perceived own group’s wrongdoing (M= 7.70, SD= 2.40) as more bidirectional than 
other group’s wrongdoing (M= 5.65, SD-=3.35). In this analysis, the Identity Relevance X Historical Representation 
interaction was significant, F (1, 69) = 3.94, p= 0.05. Participants perceived own group’s genocide as more bi-
directional than other group’s genocide, t (35) = 3.71, p= 0.02.  
10
 I used Hayes & Matthes’ (2009) MODPROBE macro to probe all interactions in Study 3 without adjusting the  
level. 
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participants engaged in interpretive denial (i.e. construed wrongdoing as more bi-directional, 
hence as something potentially other or less atrocious than “genocide”).  
 
Figure 6: Effects of historical representation and identity relevance on bidirectionality of harm 
 
Relevance of harm. Analyses for perceived relevance of harm revealed reveal a 
significant main effect of glorification score, b= -1.00, se= 0.43, p= .02, suggesting that 
glorification score is negatively associated with perceived relevance of past harm to present day 
reality. There were no main effects of historical representation, b=.78, se=0.86, p=.36 or identity 
relevance, b=.77, se=0.86, p= .37, however analyses revealed a significant Identity Relevance X 
Historical Representation interaction, b=3.81, se= 1.69, p= .03 (Figure 7). To probe the 
interaction, I conducted the similar set of simple slopes analyses. The historical representation 
manipulation did not have an effect on perceived relevance of harm among participants in the 
own group condition, b=-1.02, se=1.16, p= .38. However, it did have an effect among 
participants in the other group condition, b= 2.79, se= 1.23, p= .03. Consistent with predictions, 
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participants in the other group condition perceived “genocide” (M=10.24, SD= 3.31) as more 
relevant to present day reality than “calamity” (M=7.51, SD= 4.01).  
Moreover, I examined the effects of the identity relevance manipulation on perceived 
relevance of harm within calamity and genocide conditions. Simple slopes analyses revealed that 
the identity relevance manipulation did not have an effect on perceived relevance of harm among 
participants in the “calamity” condition, b= -1.24, se= 1.23, p= .32. However, it did have an 
effect among participants in the “genocide” condition, b= 2.58, se= 1.17, p= .03. Participants 
perceived other group’s genocide (M=10.24, SD=3.31) as more relevant to present day reality 
than own group’s genocide (M=7.94, SD=3.90).  
As anticipated, these findings reflect the differential effects of the “genocide” label on 
perceptions of harm as a function of identity concerns. Participants perceive “genocide” as more 
relevant to present day reality than “calamity” only when the label refers to other group’s 
wrongdoing but not when it refers to own group’s wrongdoing. Moreover, participants deny the 
relevance of own group’s “genocide” to present day reality to a greater extent than other group’s 
“genocide”.  
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Figure 7: Effects of historical representation and identity relevance on relevance of harm 
 
 
Reparative Action 
 Analyses revealed a marginally significant main effect of glorification, b=-.27 se=.14, 
p=.06 suggesting that participants high in glorification indicated less support for reparative 
action. Contrary to hypotheses, there were no main effects of identity relevance, b=-.19, se= 
0.28, p= .49 or historical representation, b=-.11, se=0. 28, p=.70, however analyses revealed a 
significant Identity Relevance X Historical Representation interaction, b=-1.48, se=0.54, p=.008 
(Figure 8). Once again, simple slopes analyses revealed that the historical representation 
manipulation had a significant effect on reparative action among participants in the own group 
condition, b= -.81, se= .37, p= .03. In contrast to predictions, the “calamity” representation 
elicited greater support for reparative action (M=4.42, SD=1.03) than did the “genocide” 
representation (M=3.64, SD= 1.15) among participants in the own group condition. Participants 
in the other group condition showed a trend in the opposite direction, b= .66, se=0.39, p= .09, 
such that the “genocide” representation elicited greater support for reparative action (M= 4.09, 
SD= 0.86) than did the “calamity” representation (M= 3.41, SD= 1.29).  
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 Moreover, the identity relevance manipulation had no effect among participants in the 
“genocide” condition, b= .49, se= 0.36, p= .18, but it did have an effect among participants in the 
“calamity” condition, b=-.98, se=0. 38, p= .01. Participants reported greater support for 
reparative action in response to own group’s calamity (M=4.42, SD= 1.03) than other group’s 
calamity (M= 3.41, SD=1.29).  
These findings provide some evidence for the idea that, while the framing of historical 
violence as “genocide” might be more effective in promoting reparative action among bystander 
groups, it might undermine support for reparative action among perpetrator groups
11
.  
  
Figure 8: Effects of historical representation and identity relevance on reparative action 
 
Discussion 
To summarize, results of Study 3 suggest the extent to which the implications of the 
“genocide” label vary as a function of the identity relevance of historical harm. Although the 
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 I conducted a parallel set of analyses to examine whether there were indirect effects of historical representation on 
reparative action via historical perception measures (as in Study 1). Analyses revealed no significant indirect effects. 
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“genocide” framing does not lead to differences in perceived severity or time of harm, it triggers 
different responses when it applies to own versus other group. Participants perceive own group’s 
“genocide” as more bidirectional and less relevant to present day reality than other group’s 
“genocide”. Moreover, when the “genocide” label refers to own group’s wrongdoing, 
participants report support less support for reparative action than they do when historical 
violence is framed as “calamity”. In contrast, when the “genocide” label refers to other group’s 
wrongdoing, participants perceive historical violence as more relevant to present day reality and 
tend to report greater support for reparative action than they do when historical violence is 
framed as “calamity”.  
Results further provide some evidence regarding the implications of national glorification 
for perceptions of and responses to historical violence. Consistent with past research, participants 
high in glorification engage in greater temporal distancing of harm, perceive past harm as less 
relevant to present day reality, and indicate somewhat less support for reparative action.  
General Discussion 
The present research examined the implications of the genocide label for national 
identity, collective memory, and reparative action. Across three experiments, I exposed people to 
either critical representations of history which labeled events associated with ingroup 
wrongdoing as “genocide” or to sanitized representations of history which omitted the label and 
construed events as something other than “genocide”. I then examined the effects of this 
treatment for participants’ perceptions of and responses to historical events.  
One general hypothesis for these studies concerned the impact of representations that 
mention genocide in the absence of identity concerns. More specifically, the hypothesis was that 
genocide- mentioning representations would facilitate greater perception of harm and support for 
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reparative action while genocide-silent representations would promote greater denial of harm and 
inhibit support for reparative action.  
Another general hypothesis concerned the moderating impact of identity concerns on the 
impact of representations that mentioned genocide. To the extent that genocide-mentioning 
representations of history constitute a threat to national identity, the hypothesis was that the 
pressure of identity relevant concerns (whether as a dispositional individual difference or as the 
result of situational variation via experimental manipulation) would induce participants to deny 
harm and oppose reparative action as an identity-defensive reaction.  
Effects of the Genocide Label 
With regards to implications of the “genocide” label for perceptions of harm, results 
provided mixed support for the hypotheses. The genocide label enhanced perceived severity of 
harm, even despite the otherwise denial-promoting effects of national glorification, but this effect 
was only true in Study 1. In Studies 2 and 3, the “genocide” label did not impact participants’ 
perceptions of the severity of harm. One potential reason for these different patterns of findings 
on perceived severity of harm might be the historical representations that I used as experimental 
manipulations. Studies 2 and 3 used the same text for both the sanitized and critical 
representations, but varied the framing of events. Moreover, Study 2 omitted any mention of 
historical acts of violence, while Study 3 mentioned violent acts in very brief terms. In contrast, 
the “genocide” representation in Study 1 not only varied the framing of historical events, but also 
involved a more elaborate description of numerous acts of violence, while the “sanitized” 
representation did not make references to the same violent events. Despite these important 
differences in the experimental manipulations, one possible interpretation of these studies is that 
merely labeling events as “genocide” without elaborate mentions of genocidal acts might not be 
sufficient to promote greater perception of harm. An alternative explanation is that genocide-
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silent texts that involve both literal and interpretive forms of denial (Cohen, 2001) might 
promote greater denial of harm than texts that utilize euphemistic interpretive denial alone. 
The “genocide” label did not impact participants’ temporal distancing of harm in any of 
the studies. Study 3 assessed historical perception along three additional dimensions (perceived 
threat, bi-directionality of harm and relevance of harm) and found effects on two of these (e.g. 
bi-directionality and relevance). Briefly, findings suggested that an interaction between historical 
representation and identity relevance of harm, such that participants perceived own group’s 
“genocide” as more bidirectional than other group’s “genocide”. Moreover, participants 
perceived own group’s “genocide” as less relevant to present day reality than other group’s 
“genocide”.  
The studies further yielded mixed results regarding the implications of the “genocide”  
label for reparative action. In Study 1, there was no direct effect of the “genocide” label on  
reparative action. However, the genocide representation had an indirect effect on reparative 
action via perception of harm. In a condition of identity salience which promotes  
identity-defensive motivations to deny harm, the genocide representation text still preserved  
perception of harm, which in turn led to greater support for action. In Study 2, the genocide 
representation did not have a direct effect on reparative action. However, the genocide label led 
participants to dis-identify with the nation. Given the positive relationship between national 
identification and support for Indigenous rights, the drop in identification in turn reduced 
participants’ support for Indigenous rights (including reparative action). Accounting for this 
indirect effect, the genocide label facilitated support for reparative action. In Study 3, there was 
an interaction between historical representation and identity relevance of past harm. When the 
“genocide” label applied to own group’s wrongdoing, it undermined support for reparative 
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action. When the “genocide” label applied to other group’s wrongdoing, there was a reverse 
trend such that the genocide representation elicited somewhat greater support for reparative 
action. This finding contradicts the results of Study 1, which suggested the opposite pattern.  
One potential explanation for this might concern the different pattern of results for 
perceived severity of harm. In Study 1, the “genocide” representation of own group wrongdoing 
elicited greater support for reparative action indirectly via perception of harm. However, in 
Study 3, there were no differences in perceived severity of harm. In the absence of 
acknowledgment of harm, the “genocide” label was not sufficient to elicit support for reparative 
action (see Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010). This finding resonates with previous research 
which suggests that acknowledgment of harm is necessary for reparative action (e.g., 
Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears, & Manstead, Iyer et al., 2003; McGarty et al., 2005). 
 In addition to perceptions of harm and support for reparative action, Study 1 further 
examined the effects of the “genocide” label on participants’ tendencies to reproduce critical 
(versus) sanitized forms of commemoration. Findings of this study revealed that the “genocide” 
representation led participants to reproduce more critical versions of history, but only when 
identity concerns were not high or salient.  
Effects of Identity Concerns 
In support of the hypothesis that perceptions of and responses to historical events reflect 
identity concerns, Study 1 found that identity salience reduced perceived severity of harm. In 
contrast Studies 2 and 3 did not observe any associations between identity concerns and 
perceived severity of harm. One possible explanation for this difference across the studies might 
be the different measures of national identification that were used (i.e. national glorification in 
Studies 1 and 3; private regard and identity centrality in Study 2). Another possible explanation 
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might concern differences in identity concerns across the different national settings in which 
these studies were conducted (i.e. USA in Studies 1 and 3, Costa Rica in Study 2).  
Identity concerns further impacted participants’ temporal distancing of harm differently 
across the three studies. Identity concerns were not associated with temporal distancing of harm 
in Study 2. However, in both Studies 1 and 3, higher levels of glorification were associated with 
greater temporal distancing of harm. Again, these differences might be due to the particular 
measure of national identification (i.e. national glorification) that was used in Studies 1 and 3. 
Alternatively, these differences might reflect differences in identity concerns across the national 
contexts in which I conducted these studies (i.e. USA and Costa Rica). 
General Implications 
Together, the studies suggest that the implications of the “genocide” label for perceptions 
of and responses to historical events vary as a function of identity concerns. Findings further 
reveal that invoking the term “genocide” in cases of ingroup wrongdoing might trigger opposing 
processes. First, the “genocide” label might enhance perceived severity of harm, and thus 
promote support for reparative action (Study 1). However, the “genocide” label might also 
trigger identity-defensive motivations to deny the genocidal character or relevance of harm and 
undermine support for reparative action (Study 3). In contrast, invoking the term “genocide” in 
cases of other group wrongdoing can lead to recognition of the relevance of past harm to present 
day reality and promote support for reparative action (Study 3). 
More broadly, the studies suggest that identity-defensive motivations to deny harm are 
not merely reflective of individual level processes, but are further embedded in the denial-
affording cultural tools (e.g. social representations of history) that inform people’s experience of 
identity. From a cultural psychological perspective, mainstream representations of history serve 
as intentional worlds that regulate collective identity concerns. Mainstream representations of 
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history not only reflect the identity concerns of their (re) producers (e.g. nation-glorifying 
individuals who deny or silence ingroup wrong-doing) but further direct subsequent identity 
concerns of people towards particular ends (e.g. identity-defensive motivations to deny harm or 
oppose reparative action). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One major limitation of the present studies concerns the relatively small sample sizes 
which resulted in low statistical power. Many of the patterns of results that I observed suggested 
differences in the hypothesized direction, but these did not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance. This suggests that low statistical power constrained my ability to observe 
significant relationships that might, in fact, exist (i.e., Type I error). 
Another important limitation of the present studies is their exclusive focus on people of 
European descent (in USA and Costa Rica). While this emphasis reflects an interest in processes 
of denial, it reproduces silence about Indigenous experience in mainstream psychology. One 
important question for further research concerns implications of mainstream (i.e. genocide-silent) 
representations of history for Indigenous identification and action. Some scholars have linked 
ongoing problems of Indigenous Peoples to the “legacy of chronic trauma and unresolved grief” 
(Duran & Duran, 1995; p. 27) as an enduring result of European conquest. For instance, 
researchers have linked the high rates of depression and suicide among First Nations youth to 
these youths’ limited abilities to construct a coherent narrative given their silenced history 
(Chandler & Lalone, 1998; Chandler & Proulx, 2008). Such research suggests a need to 
counteract silence regarding genocidal wrongdoing in order to achieve healing, reconciliation 
and restorative justice (Cole, 2004; Liem, 2007). More broadly, future research should examine 
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the implications of critical representations of history for healing, reconciliation, and restorative 
justice among victim as well as perpetrator and bystander groups.  
Another limitation of the design that may explain relatively weak evidence for 
hypothesized effects of manipulations is that the textual accounts of the colonial encounter used 
in the present research are relatively impoverished forms of historical representation. One can 
anticipate that more involving (e.g. visual; see Berger, 1980) forms of representation may 
produce stronger effects on perceptions of and responses to historical events than the ones I 
observed in the present studies.  
A fourth and related limitation concerns the absence of manipulation checks in the 
present research. Without manipulation checks, it is not possible to discern whether the failure to 
observe hypothesized effects of the manipulations reflect the actual absence of effects or the 
failure of experimental manipulations. The inclusion of manipulation checks would provide 
insight into this question by helping verify that the different manipulations used in these studies 
instantiated intended effects on participants. 
Finally, the present research relies on the exclusive use of experimental research 
methods. Future studies would greatly benefit from the use of non-experimental methods (survey 
research, interview studies, and other qualitative methods) to examine lay perceptions of 
“genocide”, historical knowledge of genocidal events, and the meaning of national identity. 
Future studies would further benefit from an examination of emotional responses (e.g. collective 
guilt, shame, anger) that the “genocide” label evokes among perpetrator, victim, and bystander 
groups.  
Conclusion: Beyond Intentional Worlds of Denial 
Decades of social scientific research have shown that unless effective measures are taken 
to rectify or remedy the past, historical injustice is likely to result in enduring injustice and harm. 
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In the case of nations with genocidal histories, acknowledging and accepting the different 
experiences of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders constitute the first steps to recovery and 
reconciliation (e.g. Kelman, 2008; Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008; Vollhardt, 2013). Taking 
responsibility for the past, then, means taking responsibility for the present as well as the future 
(Spinner-Halev, 2007). As scholars suggest, coming to the terms with genocidal pasts is 
necessary not only for present purposes of collective healing and reconciliation, but also for the 
prevention of future genocides (Staub, 2004, 2006).The present studies hint at two related 
directions for coming to terms with genocidal pasts. One direction for coming to terms with the 
past among perpetrator groups concerns the need to promote less identity-defensive or more self-
critical constructions of national identity, particularly among people who typically occupy 
positions of power and privilege. Consequently, an implication for future research and practice 
might involve interventions to induce changes in individual subjectivity (e.g. via processes of 
cognitive decategorization or recategorization) which has been the topic of much social 
psychological research (e.g. Brewer & Miller, 1988; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). 
However, national identities are not reified natural entities, but instead get dynamically 
reproduced in everyday action via engagement with cultural models, discursive repertories, and 
social representations. Moreover, these structures of mind-in-society have a motivational force of 
their own, regardless of the self-consciously adopted identities or benign intentions of the people 
who engage them. Therefore, the second, and arguably more critical, direction suggests that 
efforts at coming to terms with the past should target the psychological structures of denial 
embedded in everyday sociocultural worlds. Without relieving individuals of their responsibility 
for their actions, this perspective shifts the focus of interventions from the task of changing 
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individual hearts and minds to changing the sociocultural worlds in which those hearts and minds 
are embedded.  
The results of the present study suggest that a pressing task for coming to terms with 
genocidal pasts requires moving beyond intentional worlds of denial via the recovery of 
historical memory (Martin-Baro, 1994). Social representations of history that acknowledge past 
wrongdoing can not only counteract tendencies of denial and forgetting, but can further enable 
new “master narratives” (Hammack, 2009) or imaginations of national identity (Anderson, 1983) 
that affirm the common humanity of diverse peoples and mobilize action toward democratic 
innovation. As such, recovering historical memory can help reduce the risk of perpetuating past 
mistakes (Barkan, 2000; Pennebaker, Paez & Rime, 1997) and remind nations of their promise to 
“never again” repeat the horrors of genocidal acts.  
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APPENDIX A- Study 1 
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT OF AMERICA 
In 1492, Columbus discovered America and provided the catalyst for a remarkable case of 
human migration and societal change. Prior to European contact, conservative figures estimate 
that the Indigenous population in the area defined by the borders of the present United States was 
greater than 12,000,000. Four centuries later, the Indigenous population was only 237, 000—a 
98% reduction.  
European settlement of the Americas began with Columbus, who returned on his second voyage 
with settlers and plans for European colonization. The pace of colonization increased after 
Columbus departed, and eventually there were Spanish, Portuguese, French, English /British, 
Dutch, and Swedish settlements in the area that has become the United States. Policies of 
expansion continued after the creation of the independent United States of America, where 
people claimed a "manifest destiny" to occupy the continent from Atlantic to Pacific coasts.  
Americans used a number of means—some explicitly forceful/violent, others less so—to 
accomplish this manifest destiny. These methods include the following:  
 treaties, purchases, agreements and other contractual means to acquire land from 
Indigenous Nations 
 wars of conquest in which settlers forcibly acquired land from Indigenous Nations and 
displaced to less hospitable environments or to reservations;  
 acquisition of French-controlled land after the "French and Indian" conflict (1754-1763);  
 purchase of the Louisiana territory from France in 1803; 
 gradual acquisition of Florida from Spain during early 1800s;  
 treaty with Great Britain to set the northern border of the United States with Canada; 
 annexation of the Republic of Texas (1845), which was itself a creation of American 
farmers and local Tejanos who fought a war of independence from Mexico in 1836; 
 military conquest and acquisition of present-day Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, 
and parts of Colorado, Kansas, and Utah during the Mexican-American conflict (1848). 
 
These processes caused a profound demographic transformation of the American continent. 
Indigenous societies have become almost invisible in the space that they dominated 500 years ago. 
Roughly 4,000,000 people in the USA today claim Indigenous ethnicities, compared to a non-
Indigenous population of roughly 275,000,000. Non-Indigenous settlers and their descendants 
own the land and its resources, and Indigenous ways of life (e.g., religion, life kinship patterns, 
political systems, economic practices) have been replaced with English language and European-
derived ways of life. As a result, many historians regard European settlement of America to be 
one of the most profound cases of societal change in recorded human history. 
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HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN GENOCIDE 
In 1492, Columbus arrived in what we now call North America.  For Indigenous Peoples, this event 
and its aftermath were a catastrophe. Prior to European contact, conservative figures estimate that 
the Indigenous population in the area defined by the borders of the present United States was greater 
than 12,000,000. Four centuries later, the Indigenous population was only 237, 000—a 98% 
reduction. 
Large-scale killing began with Columbus, who returned on his second voyage and quickly 
implemented policies of slavery and mass extermination. However, mass killing did not stop 
after Columbus departed. Expansion of the European colonies led to similar genocides, which 
continued after the creation of the independent United States of America as successive 
administrations enacted policies to grab land for white settlers.  
During American expansion into the western frontier, settlers and governments used a variety of 
methods—some explicitly violent, others more subtle—to destroy Indigenous societies and 
cultures. These methods include the following:  
 wars of conquest; 
 military raids and terrorist attacks on Indigenous villages; 
 forced marches to relocate Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people 
due to starvation, disease, and exposure;  
 confinement of Indigenous societies to "reservations", often located in undesirable areas 
far from the communities' place of origin, that almost insured poverty and subjugation. 
 infection of Indigenous communities with smallpox and other diseases;  
 destruction of flora and fauna (e.g., buffalo herds) that Indigenous Peoples used for food, 
clothing, housing material, tools, and medicine; 
 imposition of farming and ranching lifestyles upon Indigenous Peoples; and  
 forced removal of Indigenous children from home communities to attend boarding schools, 
where authorities not only stole their labor, but also poisoned their minds.  
 
These processes caused a profound demographic transformation of the American continent. 
Indigenous societies have become almost invisible in the space that they dominated 500 years 
ago. Roughly 4,000,000 people in the USA today claim Indigenous ethnicities, compared to a 
non-Indigenous population of roughly 275,000,000. Non-Indigenous settlers and their 
descendants have occupied the land, taken its resources, and replaced Indigenous ways of life 
(e.g., religion, life kinship patterns, political systems, economic practices) with English language 
and European-derived ways of life. As a result, many historians regard the European conquest of 
America to be one of most profound cases of genocide in recorded human history. 
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National Glorification (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) 
Instructions: We all belong to different social groups or social categories. We would like you to 
consider the nation to which you belong, and to respond to the following statements on the basis 
of how you feel about your nation. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these 
statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions.  
1. Other nations can learn a lot from us. 
2. In today’s world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation. 
3. The US Army is the best army in the world. 
4. One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our 
nation. 
5. Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation. 
6. It is disloyal for Americans to criticize the US. 
7. The US is better than other nations in all respects. 
8. There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national 
authorities. 
Historical Perception 
1. How violent or brutal was the European conquest of North America? 
2. How many Indigenous people died as a direct result of European settlers’ actions during the 
conquest of North America? 
3. To what extent was the collapse of Indigenous societies due to deliberate policies of violence by 
European settlers?  
4. When did violence associated with the European conquest of North America occur?  
Reparative Action  
1. The U.S. should officially apologize to Native American nations for all broken treaties, illegal 
appropriation of land, forced displacement, and massacres perpetrated against Native Americans.  
2. The U.S. should provide reparation and compensation for damages to Native Americans who 
were removed from their homes and forced to attend boarding schools. 
3. The U.S. should establish a National Day of Apology to memorialize and atone for suffering 
inflicted upon Native Americans 
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Critical Commemoration 
In your opinion, what are the 5 most important events to commemorate during Native American 
History Month (November)? (Fill in blank) 
What should future generations of high school students learn about American history? Please 
rank the following from 1 (most important) to 10 (least important) according to their importance 
for history education.  
___ Sacajawea: The Shoshoni woman who assisted the Lewis and Clark expedition to explore 
the Louisiana Purchase 
___ Trail of Tears: President Jackson ordered re-location of the Cherokee Nation from Southeast 
USA to Oklahoma. Thousands died on the subsequent "death march".  
___Wounded Knee: USA soldiers massacre 128 Lakota men, women, and children at Wounded 
Knee, South Dakota. 
___ Code Talkers: Members of the Navajo Nation who served with the U.S. Marine Corps in 
World War II for the purpose of transmitting secret messages. 
___ Jim Thorpe: Native American football and track star who was voted Greatest Athlete of the 
first half of the 20
th
 Century. 
___ Inventions: Native Americans domesticated crops (e.g., maize, squash) and designed such 
products as moccasins, toboggans, snow shoes, and kayaks. 
___ Iroquois Confederacy: Union of five Indigenous American Nations under a "Great Binding 
Law" that many scholars see as an influence on the U.S. Constitution. 
___ King Philip's War: English colonists kill 88% of the Wampanoag, the people who had saved 
them from starvation in events commemorated in popular depictions of the Thanksgiving 
holiday. The war started with apparent poisoning of Wampanoag leader Wamsutta in English 
custody and ended with beheading of his brother (and successor) Metacom.  
___ Chief Joseph: Leader of a group of Nez Perce Indians who resisted forced removal by the 
U.S. to a reservation in Idaho. The group fled across 1700 miles with 2000 U.S. Cavalry in 
pursuit in an attempt to reach refuge in Canada. The U.S. soldiers captured them only 40 miles 
from the border. Although Chief Joseph negotiated terms of surrender that provided for safe 
return to their home in Oregon, the U.S. forces broke their promise and marched the captured 
band of Nez Perce to Kansas. 
___ Sequoyah: Cherokee man who invented a system of writing for the Cherokee language. 
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APPENDIX B- Study 2 
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT OF THE AMERICAS 
The Spanish Discovery and Settlement of the Americas was the conquest, settlement and 
political rule over much of the western hemisphere. It was initiated by the Spanish conquistadors 
and developed by the Monarchy of Spain through its administrators and missionaries. Beginning 
with the 1492 arrival of Christopher Columbus, over nearly four centuries the Spanish Empire 
expanded across: most of present day Central America, the Caribbean islands, and Mexico; much 
of the rest of North America including the Southwestern, Southern coastal, and California Pacific 
Coast regions of the United States and the western half of South America. 
These processes caused a profound demographic transformation of the American continent. 
Indigenous populations have declined by an estimated 95% and become almost invisible in the 
space that they dominated 500 years ago. Non-Indigenous settlers and their descendants own the 
land and its resources, and Indigenous ways of life (e.g., religion, life kinship patterns, political 
systems, economic practices) have been replaced with Spanish language and Spanish-derived 
ways of life. As a result, many historians regard Spanish settlement of America to be one of the 
most profound cases of societal change in recorded human history. 
 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN GENOCIDE 
The Spanish Conquest and Genocide of the Americas was the conquest, destruction and 
political rule over much of the western hemisphere. It was initiated by the Spanish conquistadors 
and developed by the Monarchy of Spain through its administrators and missionaries. Beginning 
with the 1492 arrival of Christopher Columbus, over nearly four centuries the Spanish Empire 
expanded across: most of present day Central America, the Caribbean islands, and Mexico; much 
of the rest of North America including the Southwestern, Southern coastal, and California Pacific 
Coast regions of the United States and the western half of South America. 
These processes caused a profound demographic transformation of the American continent. 
Indigenous populations have declined by an estimated 95% and become almost invisible in the 
space that they dominated 500 years ago. Non-Indigenous settlers and their descendants own the 
land and its resources, and Indigenous ways of life (e.g., religion, life kinship patterns, political 
systems, economic practices) have been replaced with Spanish language and Spanish-derived 
ways of life. As a result, many historians regard the Spanish conquest of America to be one of 
mostprofound cases of genocide in recorded human history. 
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Historical Perception 
1. How violent or brutal was the European conquest of the Americas? 
2. How many Indigenous people died as a direct result of European settlers’ actions during the 
conquest of the Americas? 
3. To what extent was the collapse of Indigenous societies due to deliberate policies of violence by 
European settlers?  
4. When did violence associated with the European conquest of the Americas occur?  
Identity Centrality 
1. Overall, being Costa Rican has very little to do with how I feel about myself. Reverse scored 
2. Being Costa Rican is an important reflection of who I am. 
3. Being Costa Rican is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am. Reverse scored 
4. In general, being Costa Rican is an important part of my self image.  
Private Regard 
1. In general, I’m glad to be a citizen of Costa Rica. 
2. I often regret that I am Costa Rican. Reverse scored 
3. Overall, I feel that Costa Rica is not worthwhile. Reverse scored 
4. I feel good about being Costa Rican. 
Support for Indigenous Rights  
1. Costa Rica should provide reparation and compensation for past damage to Indigenous 
Peoples. 
2. Costa Rica should provide job opportunities for Indigenous communities living on or near 
reservations. 
3. Costa Rica should provide health care facilities to Indigenous communities living on or near 
reservations. 
4. Costa Rica should allow Indigenous farmers access to agricultural credit. 
5. Costa Rica should protect Indigenous land rights. 
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Other Policy Items (not included in the analyses) 
1. Costa Rica should have a military defense force. 
2. Costa Rica should support CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement). 
3. Costa Rica should strengthen its northern border security. 
4. Costa Rica should provide bilingiual (Spanish and Indigenous language) education in 
elementary schools on Indigenous reservations.  
5. Costa Rica should increase fines for employing undocumented immigrants. 
6. Costa Rica should strive for greater regional integration with Central American countries. 
7. Costa Rica should have the right to remove Indigenous Peoples from the lands they occupy. 
8. Costa Rica should deport undocumented Nicaraguan immigrants and their families.  
9. Costa Rica should align its policies with the USA. 
10. Costa Rica should protect the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families. 
11. Costa Rica should expand its economic cooperation with the US. 
12. Costa Rica should have the right to extract energy resources from Indigenous reservations 
and lands. 
13. Costa Rica should allow the US Navy access to Costa Rican waters and ports. 
14. Costa Rica should have the right to allocate Indigenous lands to non-Indigenous Costa Rican 
ranchers and farmers.  
15. Costa Rica should establish a National Day of Apology to memorialize suffering inflicted 
upon Indigenous Peoples. 
Demographic Information 
Age  
Gender 
Nationality 
Ethnicity 
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APPENDIX C- Study 3 
For Indigenous case:  
The Indigenous Calamity, also known as the Big Calamity and the Great Catastrophe, was 
the massive destruction of the Indigenous Peoples of the present day Americas. It involved the 
use of massacres, attacks on Indigenous villages, and forced marches to relocate Indigenous 
communities, which killed thousands of people due to starvation, cold, and disease. Many 
historians regard these events as one of the most profound cases of societal change in recorded 
human history. 
The Indigenous Genocide, also known as the American Holocaust and the American Indian 
Holocaust was the massive destruction of the Indigenous Peoples of the present day Americas. It 
involved the use of massacres, attacks on Indigenous villages, and forced marches to relocate 
Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people due to starvation, cold, and disease. 
Many historians regard these events as one of the most profound cases of genocide in recorded 
human history. 
 
For Armenian case:  
The Armenian Calamity, also known as the Big Calamity and the Great Catastrophe, was the 
massive destruction of the Armenian population of the former Ottoman Empire (present day 
Turkey). It involved the use of massacres, attacks on Armenian villages, and forced marches to 
relocate Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people due to starvation, cold, and 
disease. Many historians regard these events as one of the most profound cases of societal 
change in recorded human history. 
The Armenian Genocide, also known as the Armenian Holocaust and the Armenian 
Massacres was the massive destruction of the Armenian population of the former Ottoman 
Empire (present day Turkey). It involved the use of massacres, attacks on Armenian villages, and 
forced marches to relocate Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people due to 
starvation, cold, and disease. Many historians regard these events as one of the most profound 
cases of genocide in recorded human history. 
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National Glorification (Roccas, Klar, Liviatan, 2006) 
1. Other nations can learn a lot from us. 
2.  In today’s world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation. 
3.  The US Army is the best army in the world. 
4.  One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our 
nation. 
5. Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation. 
6. It is disloyal for Americans to criticize the US. 
7. The US is better than other nations in all respects. 
8. There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national 
authorities. 
Historical Perception 
1. How violent or brutal was the European settlers’ [Ottoman Empire’s] treatment of Indigenous 
Peoples [Armenians]? 
2. How many Native Americans [Armenians] died as a direct result of European [Ottoman] 
attacks?  
3. To what extent was the collapse of Indigenous [Armenian] communities due to deliberate 
policies of violence by the European settlers [Ottoman Empire]?  
4. When did violence associated with the European [Ottoman] treatment of Native Americans 
[Armenians] occur?  
5. To what extent did Indigenous [Armenian] communities pose a threat to European settlers 
[Ottoman Empire]? 
6. To what extent was the violence bi-directional (e.g. including attacks and killing by both 
European settlers [Ottoman Empire] and Indigenous Peoples [Armenians])? 
7. To what extent is the past treatment of Native Americans [Armenians] relevant to present day 
realities? 
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Reparative Action 
1. The US [Turkey] should officially apologize to Native American nations [Armenians] for 
forced displacement and massacres perpetrated against Native Americans [Armenian 
communities]. 
2. The US [Turkey] should provide reparation and compensation for damage to Native 
Americans [Armenians].  
3. The US [Turkey] should establish a National Day of Apology to memorialize and atone for 
suffering inflicted upon Native Americans [Armenians]. 
Demographic Information 
Age 
Gender 
Nationality 
Ethnicity 
 
 
